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Community Participation in
Development
George K. Foster*
ABSTRACT

A remarkableseries of legal reforms and private innovations
has given municipalities, indigenous peoples, and other local
groups vital opportunities to influence development projects and
secure economic benefits. This Article demonstrates the existence
of this global trend and offers a model for explaining how and
why it has manifested, as well as why-despite impressive
gains-many communities still lack what they would consider
sufficient influence or benefits. First, the Article argues that all of
the formal rights and powers that local interests have secured in
recent years result from pressure by communities and their
supporters and are designed to address specific deficiencies in
higher-level decision making. Second, while higher authorities
have made a number of concessions, they have consistently
tailored any new community rights and powers to avoid giving
local interests outright control over development, for reasons both
self-interested andgrounded in legitimatepublic policy concerns.
Third, communities are increasingly turning to private
mechanisms to supplement their formal rights andpowers. These
mechanisms offer a number of advantages, but their viability
ultimately depends on communities possessing-and effectively
leveraging-robustpublic sources of influence.
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1. INTRODUCTION

Once marginalized in the decision making over business activities
with high environmental and social impacts, local communities around
the world are increasingly playing a more assertive role.' It is now
common in many countries for municipalities, citizen coalitions,
indigenous peoples, and other local groups to wield significant
influence over the development process. Local interests may exercise
this influence by enacting zoning ordinances, 2 offering comments
during environmental impact assessments (EIAs), 3 or filing citizen
suits, 4 among other possibilities. It is also increasingly common for
local interests to receive compensation for project impacts or even to
collaborate with developers as business partners. 5 In short,
communities are participating in development in ever more diverse
and meaningful ways: as regulators, as law enforcers, as
commentators, and as economic actors.
Regulatory powers of local governments are one important source
of community influence. Many local governments have acquired more
expansive powers through a global trend toward "decentralization," 6 or
have sought to use preexisting powers in novel ways. Such regulatory
assertiveness can be seen, for example, in efforts by local governments
in the United States and Spain to ban hydraulic fracturing-or
"fracking"-within their territories.7 Meanwhile,
many local

1.
See George S. Akpan, Host State Legal and Policy Responses to Resource
Control Claims by Host Communities: Implications for Investment in the Natural
Resources Sector, in INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE MINERAL LAW AND POLICY:

TRENDS AND PROSPECTS 283, 290 (Elizabeth Bastida, Thomas Walde & Janeth WardenFernandez eds., 2005) (asserting that historically the state in some countries has
"appropriate[d] to itself the right for control and management of the resources without
recourse to the host populations," but, in recent years, many states have adopted reforms
that give local populations a greater role).
2.
See infra Part II.A.1.
See infra Part II.B.1.a.
3.
4.
See infra Part II.B.1.b.
5.
See infra Part III.B.
6.
See Jean-Paul Faguet & Caroline Paschl, Is Decentralization Good for
Development?, in Is DECENTRALIZATION GOOD FOR DEVELOPMENT?: PERSPECTIVES FROM
ACADEMICS AND POLICY MAKERS 1, 1 (Jean-Paul Faguet & Caroline Paschl eds., 2015)
(observing that in recent years "new or deepening [decentralization] reforms have been
announced in countries as disparate as Japan, Cambodia, France, Turkey, and Kenya,
amongst many others."); Andrbs Rodriguez-Pose & Nicholas Gill, The Global Trend
Towards Devolution and Its Implications, 21 ENV'T & PLAN. C: Gov. & POLY 333, 337
(2003) (describing a "global trend in the transference of powers, authority, and resources
to subnational levels of government").
7.
See Albert C. Lin, Fracking and Federalism:A Comparative Approach to
Reconciling National and Subnational Interests in the United States and Spain, 44
ENVTL. L. 1039, 1048 (2014) (discussing fracking bans enacted by several communities
in Spain); David B. Spence, The PoliticalEconomy of Local Vetoes, 93 TEX. L. REV. 351,
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governments have secured mandated shares of revenue collected by
higher authorities from development activities, such as severance
taxes from mining and oil and gas extraction. 8
Local interests have also acquired more influence through a global
proliferation of requirements for higher authorities and project
developers to conduct EIAs before undertaking development projects.9
EIA regimes typically require decision makers to take into account
potential impacts on communities and give members of the public the
right to receive information and offer input during the process.10
Stakeholders have also gained access-to-justice rights in many
countries, allowing them to participate in the enforcement of
projects."1
implicated by development
environmental
laws
Stakeholders availing themselves of these opportunities have delayed,
blocked, or secured modifications to numerous projects-two
prominent recent examples being the Keystone XL Pipeline in the
United States1 2 and the Whites Point Quarry and Marine Terminal in
Canada.' 3
At the same time, indigenous communities are increasingly
accorded special safeguards to address their unique vulnerability to
the impacts of development and barriers to participation in decision
making.1 4 These safeguards have enabled indigenous groups to halt
several major development projects to which they were opposed, from
a proposed coal terminal near Seattle' 5 to a gold mine in Chile.' 6
Moreover, when indigenous or other local communities are
amenable to development proposals, they are increasingly able to

370 (2014) ("[Llocal governments [in the United States] are enacting de facto or de jure
fracking bans in rapidly increasing numbers.").

8.
9.

See Rodriguez-Pose & Gill, supranote 6, at 338; see also infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.

10.
NEIL CRAIK, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
ASSESSMENT: PROCESS, SUBSTANCE AND INTEGRATION 3-4 (2008) (describing EIA

regimes around the world).
11.
See generally Domenico Amirante, Environmental Courts in Comparative
Perspective: Preliminary Reflections on the National Green Tribunal of India, 29 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 441, 445 (2012); Bende Toth, Public Participationand Democracy in
Practice-Aarhus Convention Principles as Democratic Institution Building in the
Developing World, 30 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 295, 311-35 (2010) (discussing
access-to-justice mechanisms in the United States, Europe, and the developing world).
12.
See infra Part II.B.1.b.
13.
See infra Part II.B.2.
14.
See infra Part II.C.
15.
See, e.g., Kirk Johnson, Tribe's FishingRights Halt Proposed Coal Terminal,
N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2016, at All (describing the defeat of a proposal to build a coal
terminal near Seattle following objections by the Lummi Nation).
16.
Fabiana Li, The Defeat of Pascua Lama: How Local Resistance Halted
Construction of a Destructive Mining Project on the Chilean Border, NORTH AM. CONG.

ON LATIN AM. (Mar. 9, 2016), http://nacla.org/news/2016/03/09/defeat-pascua-lama
[https://perma.cc/48FA-QZ6V] (archived Oct. 20, 2017) (discussing the closure of a gold
mine in Chile following a successful lawsuit by the Diaguita indigenous community).
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negotiate private agreements with project developers that provide for
impact mitigation and benefit sharing.1 7 Benefits provided under these
agreements may include shares of profits or production, infrastructure
improvements, employment or contracting preferences, and even
equity stakes in projects.18
Scholars have engaged aspects of these developments, but the
literature is fragmentary. Separate lines of scholarship address
discrete components of what this Article dubs collectively "community
participation in development." These separate lines explore, for
example, local fracking bans and moratoria,19 decentralization
processes in foreign countries, 20 public participation in environmental
matters, 2 ' rights of indigenous communities, 22 and particular types of
community-developer agreements. 23 Yet the time is ripe for examining
these phenomena collectively-for considering to what extent they
relate to one another and their significance as a whole. When such an
examination is undertaken, it becomes clear that all of these
phenomena are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. It becomes
clear, moreover, that together they constitute a global wave of reform
and innovation that is transforming relations between local
communities, higher authorities, and project developers around the
world.
And yet-as remarkable as these gains by local interests aremany communities have not yet secured what they consider a sufficient
voice in decision making or an adequate share of benefits. In some
cases, higher authorities refuse to transfer powers or benefits sought

17.
See infra Part III.B.
See Danielle Campbell & Janet Eileen Hunt, Achieving Broader Benefits
18.
from Indigenous Land Use Agreements: Community Development in Central Australia,
48 COMMiUNITY DEV. J. 197, 203-06 (2013) (describing agreements between mining
companies and Aboriginal groups in Australia and the benefits provided thereunder);
Ginger Gibson & Ciaran O'Faircheallaigh, IBA Community Toolkit: Negotiation and
Implementation of Impact and Benefit Agreements, GORDON FOUND. 96-97 (Summer

[https://perma.cclNV3Q-4JR7]
2015),
http://gordonfoundation.ca/publication/669
(archived Oct. 20, 2017) (describing provisions in agreements between developers and
Canadian Aboriginal groups that address impact mitigation); Newmont Ghana Signs
Revised Social Responsibility Agreements with Ahafo Communities, NEWMONT MINING
CORP. (July 1, 2014), http://ourvoice.newmont.com/2014/07/01/newmont-ghana-signs-

revised-social-responsibility-agreements-with-ahafo-communities/
[https://perma.cc/37F9-2E58 (archived Nov. 14, 2017) (describing community benefits
provided under agreements between a mining company and communities in Ghana).

19.
20.
21.

See, e.g., Spence, supra note 7, at 370.
See, e.g., Faguet & Poschl, supra note 6, at 7-8.
See, e.g., Toth, supra note 11, at 306-309.

22.

See generally, e.g., S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL

LAW 39-70 (2d ed. 2000).
See, e.g., Gibson & O'Faircheallaigh, supra note 18, at 96.
23.
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by local communities 24 or move forward with projects despite strong
local opposition. 25
Higher authorities' motivations vary, but principled arguments
can sometimes be made for declining to give further influence or
benefits to local communities. Notably, entrusting local governments
with greater regulatory powers may risk a weakening of environmental
standards or enforcement, due to limited local capacity or
accountability. 2 6 Benefits accorded to local interests may be siphoned
off by corrupt local elites.27 Transferring more revenues to the local
level may exacerbate economic disparities within a country or region 28
or even fuel separatist movements. 29 Higher authorities may also be
concerned that communities in the vicinity of a project cannot
objectively assess its risks and benefits, and would hold the broader
public interest hostage to unfounded local fears.3 0 For all of these

24.
See, e.g., Akpan, supra note 1, at 300 (asserting that, in Nigeria, "[m]embers
of the host populations are still not given a say or any influence in the processes leading
to the granting of legal authorizations to exploit natural resources or any say on how the
proceeds are disbursed."); see also David W. Case, The Role of Information in
Environmental Justice, 81 MISS. L. J. 701, 718 (2012) (discussing barriers to
participation by low-income and minority communities in environmental decision
making in the United States).
An example is President Trump's decision to revive the permitting processes
25.
for the Keystone XL and Dakota Access Pipelines, despite significant community
opposition and prior decisions by the Obama administration halting both projects. See
Steven Mufson & Juliet Eilperin, Trump Seeks to Spark Action on Oil Pipelines, WASH.
POST, Jan. 25, 2017, at Al.
26.
See Jesse C. Ribot, Democratic Decentralisation of Natural Resources:
Institutional Choice and DiscretionaryPower Transfers in Sub-SaharanAfrica, 23 PUB.
ADMIN. DEV. 53, 54 (2003) ("Decentralisations in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Guinea,
Malawi, Niger, the Gambia and Zimbabwe . . . are transferring decision-making powers
to various unaccountable local bodies, threatening local equity and the environment.");
Ryan Stoa, Subsidiarity in Principle:Decentralizationof Water Resources Management,
10 UTRECHT L. REV. 31, 34 (2014) ("Local communities are less likely to have access to
environmental science, data, and the modeling tools necessary to create dynamic
management systems.").
See WORLD BANK INDEPENDENT EVALUATION GROUP, DECENTRALIZATION IN
27.
CLIENT COUNTRIES: AN EVALUATION OF WORLD BANK SUPPORT, 1990-2007, at 4 (2008)

("[C]apture by political and other local elites can readily emerge as power is transferred
to the local level, where entrenched inequities may help elites orient service delivery
toward themselves and away from the poor.").

See Eric A. Coleman & Forrest D. Fleischman, Comparing Forest
28.
Decentralizationand Local InstitutionalChange in Bolivia, Kenya, Mexico, and Uganda,
40 WORLD DEV. 836, 841 (2012) ("Many authors have argued that decentralization
exacerbates wealth differences at the local level.").
See Thomas W. Wdlde, International Standards:A Professional Challenge
29.
for Natural Resources and Energy Lawyers, in INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE
MINERAL LAw AND POLICY: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS, supra note 1, at 219, 232 (local

control over mineral rent can "generate[] financial resources for building up power of
insurgent groups" and "weaken[] the government's often fragile grip over the area").
30.

See CHARLES

H. ECCLESTON, ENVIRONMENTAL

IMPACT ASSESSMENT: A

GUIDE TO BEST PROFESSIONAL PRACTICES 177 (2011) (discussing the potential for local
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reasons, communities have often fallen short of their aspirations in the
political arena.
This Article will demonstrate that all of these events-the gains
secured by communities as well as their limitations-result from a
recurring set of causes and countervailing forces. It will show in
particular that the global wave of community participation in
development can be explained by the following three-part model. First,
the diverse formal rights and powers that local interests have secured
are all attributable to pressures on higher authorities, which result
from perceived deficiencies in higher authorities' ability or willingness
to protect local communities and the environment, or to share benefits
equitably.3 ' Second, although higher authorities have ceded various
forms of influence and benefits, they have carefully tailored each
category of community rights and powers in a specific way: to avoid
outright local control over major development activities.3 2 Third,
private mechanisms have emerged that increasingly supplement
communities' formal rights and powers.3 3 These mechanisms offer
flexibility and can produce further gains without the need for more
extensive political change. Yet private mechanisms have limitations of
their own and their viability ultimately depends on communities
possessing-and effectively leveraging-robust public sources of
influence.3 4
The discussion in this Article will proceed as follows. Part II will
explore several formal sources of influence and benefits that
communities around the world have secured in recent years, or have
begun to use more aggressively. Part III will examine private
mechanisms that have emerged as further sources of community
leverage. Part IV will explain why the global wave of community
participation has manifested and why its public and private aspects
have assumed their particular forms. Part V will conclude.

II. COMMUNITIES' GROWING FORMAL RIGHTS AND POWERS

In recent decades, local governments and stakeholders around the
world have acquired diverse rights and powers under domestic and
international law, which they can use to influence development and
secure benefits. The subparts that follow explore several such formal

communities to have an exaggerated perception of risks associated with development
projects).
See infra Part IV.A.
31.
See infra Part IV.B.
32.
See infra Part IV.C.
33.
See infra Part IV.C.3.
34.
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sources of leverage: (i) local governments' regulatory powers and
revenue-sharing mandates, (ii) EIA requirements and public
participation in environmental decision making and enforcement, and
(iii) safeguards specific to indigenous and traditional communities. 35
A. Local Regulatory Powers and Revenue-Sharing Mandates
1.

Developments in the United States

In the United States, local regulatory powers derive from the
state's inherent "police power" to protect health, safety, welfare, and
morals.3 6 Although the police power resides in the state government,
all states have delegated certain aspects of that power to local
governments, including the authority to enact land-use regulations in
the public interest.3 7 The nature and scope of that delegation vary, but
local governments generally have the authority to enact a wide range
of regulations governing the use of land within or near municipal
boundaries.38 Mechanisms for regulating land use include the adoption
of comprehensive land-use plans (which establish general goals and
policies for local development); 39 zoning ordinances (which implement
the comprehensive plan by dividing the land into zones or districts of
land and specifying the permissible uses for each); 40 and subdivision
and site plan regulations (which provide more detailed requirements
for particular locations). 4 1
Many local governments have applied these powers in new and
more intensive ways in recent years in response to stakeholder
concerns
about development activities.
Notably, many local
governments have created special zoning districts or ordinances to

35.

Communities in some countries may possess other formal sources of leverage

as well. For example, in a paper written for a recent symposium organized by the Author,
Albert Lin identifies various other sources available in the United States, including the
law of nuisance and other common law torts, the public trust doctrine, and other
environmental laws. See Albert C. Lin, Community Levers for Benefit Sharing,21 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 357, 364-75 (2017).
36.
See FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 10.0 1(4)(a) (2017).
37.
See id.; see also Shelby D. Green, Development Agreements: Bargained-for
Zoning that Is Neither Illegal Contract nor ConditionalZoning, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 383,
386 (2004).
38.

See RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY

§ 79C. 10(2)(a)

(Michael

Allan Wolf ed., 2017).
39.
See generally Craig Anthony Arnold, Planning Milagros: Environmental
Justice and Land Use Regulation, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 1 (1998) (describing
comprehensive plans).
40.

See PATRICK J. ROHAN & ERIC DAMIAN KELLY, ZONING AND LAND USE

CONTROLS § 37.03 (2017) (describing zoning ordinances).
41.
See Arnold, supra note 39, at 94; John R. Nolon, In Praiseof Parochialism:
The Advent of Local Environmental Law, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365, 373-74 (2002)
(providing examples of subdivision and site plan regulations).
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protect natural resources from development, or to control sources of
pollution not covered by state or federal law. 42 Many are also
regulating development activities that are already regulated
extensively by state or federal law. The oil and gas industry, for
example, has recently experienced an explosion in local-level
regulation in response to pressure from citizens concerned about the
spread of fracking into populated areas. 43
Fracking is an unconventional method of production used to
access oil and gas deposits in shale formations. 44 The operator drills
into the shale layer before injecting chemicals and water into the
ground at high pressure, causing the shale to fracture and allowing oil
or gas to escape and flow into production wells. 45 Fracking operations
can cause numerous adverse impacts, including groundwater
contamination, air pollution, truck traffic, seismic activity, and noise,
among others. 46 Local fracking ordinances seek to limit these impacts
by restricting where drilling can occur, limiting hours of operation, and
requiring various mitigations and safeguards. 47 Some local ordinances
have even attempted to ban fracking or other forms of drilling
altogether within city or county borders. 48 Local governments are also
increasingly imposing "impact fees" or bond requirements on operators
to cover extra road maintenance and other governmental expenses
caused by fracking. 49 Mining, quarrying, and logging have likewise

See Nolon, supra note 41, at 410-11 (summarizing local environmental
42.
measures, and observing that they often address the loss of natural resources to
suburbanization or water and air pollution not adequately addressed by state and federal
law).
43.
See Alex Ritchie, On Local Fracking Bans: Policy and Preemption in New
Mexico, 54 NAT. RESOURCES J. 255, 258-59 (2014) (increased local regulation of fracking
seeks to address local negative externalities in the face of a "community outcry from
voters"); Spence, supra note 7, at 351 ("[W]ithin the last few years more than 400 local
governments, from California to Texas to New York, have enacted ordinances restricting
or banning within their borders the use of' fracking).
44.
See David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political
Economy of Energy Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 438-39 (2013).
45.
Id.
46.
See Spence, supra note 7, at 358-68 (summarizing potential environmental
and social impacts of fracking).
See Sorrell E. Negro, Fracking Wars: Federal, State and Local Conflicts over
47.
the Regulation of Natural Gas Activities, 35 ZONING & PLANNING L. REP. 1, 7-9 (2012)
(describing municipal ordinances that regulate fracking).
Spence, supra note 7, at 356-57.
48.
See Joel Minor, Local Government FrackingRegulations: A Colorado Case
49.
Study, 33 STAN. ENvTL. L. J. 59, 114 (2013); Ritchie, supra note 43, at 283 ("[S]ome
counties across the country have begun to assess impact fees on a per well basis to offset
the cost of maintaining, repairing, and even improving county roads."); see also
ANNEMARGARET CONNOLLY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN REAL EST. & Bus. TRANSACTIONS

§ 25.04(2)(e)(vii) (2017) ("In addition to impact fees, some municipalities may require
applicants for gas drilling permits to post bonds for fees, penalties, violations, or damage
to roads.").
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been targeted by local ordinances, as municipalities and counties have
reacted to citizen concerns about these activities' environmental and
social impacts.5 0
In an effort to compensate for impacts of extractive activities,
some states have adopted laws providing for local governments in
affected areas to receive a specified portion of tax revenues collected by
the state from project developers, which they can spend on schools or
other community benefits.51
Yet higher authorities have resisted some efforts by local
governments to regulate extractive activities. In particular, some
states have enacted legislation that expressly limits local regulation of
specific sectors. 52 In addition, state and federal courts have repeatedly
struck down local ordinances regulating fracking or other extractive
activities even in the absence of express preemption, if these courts
perceived the ordinances as conflicting with or impeding the state
regulatory framework.5 3
One exception to this pattern is a 2013 decision by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, which declined to invalidate a local fracking
ordinance that was expressly preempted by state law and struck down
the state regulatory framework instead. 54 Specifically, in Robinson

50.
See, e.g., Hoffman Mining Co. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 612 Pa. 598, 604 (2011)
(lawsuit challenging ordinance enacted by Adams Township in Pennsylvania that
restricted mining and imposed setbacks); Colo. Mining Ass'n v. Bd. of County Comm'rs,
199 P.3d 718, 721 (Colo. 2009) (lawsuit challenging ban by Summit County, Colorado on
the use of cyanide in gold mining); MIKE JACOBSON, ELIF KAYNAK & COREEN RIPP,
DEALING
WITH
LOCAL
TflMtBER
HARVESTING
ORDINANCES
3
(2004),

http://conservationtools.org/library-items/235-Dealing-with-Local-Timber-HarvestingOrdinances (last visited Oct. 21, 2017) [https://perma.cc/E8DU-97NZ] (archived Oct. 21,
2017).
See Minor, supra note 49, at 86 ("[T]he primary government revenues from
51.
fracking-mineral leasing revenues and severance taxes-go to federal and state
governments, not to local governments. A few states, including Colorado, transfer some

of those funds to local governments."); cf. Chris Groeschen, Coal Severance Tax: The
Move Towards EducationalAdvancement in Kentucky Coal-ProducingCounties, 44 J. L.
& EDUC. 145, 152 (2015) ("In 2009, Tennessee passed a bill allocating 100% of their coal
severance tax funds back to coal-producing counties, with fifty percent of the funds
specifically marked for education.").
52.
See, e.g., In re Wallach v. Town of Dryden et al., 16 N.E.3d 1188, 1196-97,
1199 (N.Y. 2014); JACOBSON, KAYNAK & RIPP, supra note 50, at 4-5 (summarizing
Pennsylvania state legislation restricting local regulation of timber harvesting).
53.
See, e.g., Swepi, LP v. Mora County, 81 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1198-1203 (D. N.M.
2015); City of Longmont Colo. v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass'n, 369 P.3d 573, 585 (Colo. 2016);
State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., 37 N.E.3d 128, 135-37 (Ohio 2015); Colo.
Mining Ass'n, 199 P.3d at 721-22 (Summit County's ban on the use of cyanide in gold
mining was preempted because it excluded what the Colorado state mining law
authorized); Northeast Natural Energy, LLC v. City of Morgantown, No. 11C--411, 2011
WL 3584376, at *9 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 12, 2011) (striking down a municipal ordinance
that prohibited oil and gas drilling in areas where the West Virginia state government
had authorized wells).
54.
Robinson Twp. V. Commonwealth, 623 Pa. 564 (2013).
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Township v. Commonwealth, a plurality of the court invalidated
portions of a state oil and gas statute, Act 13, which required local
governments to treat oil and gas operations as permitted in all zoning
districts within their territories.5 5 The plurality acknowledged that
local governments' regulatory powers had been delegated by the state,
and that the state could limit those powers.56 Nevertheless, these
justices found Act 13 inconsistent with a provision of the Pennsylvania
Constitution-known as the Environmental Rights Amendmentwhich guarantees the right of all people in the state to clean air and
pure water.57 According to the plurality, the state could not require
municipalities to permit fracking everywhere within their territories,
without taking reasonable precautions against well contamination, air
pollution, and other impacts.5 8 Nevertheless, the decision in Robinson
Township did not suggest that local governments in Pennsylvania have
unfettered discretion to regulate fracking. Notably, local governments
still cannot ban fracking altogether within their territory.5 9
In that sense, Robinson Township did not deviate from a broader
trend in the case law. Courts around the country have consistently
struck down local ordinances that purported to ban fracking or other
extractive activities completely, provided the bans were contrary to
state policy. 60 Although New York's highest court upheld a local
government's ban on fracking, New York had a statewide moratorium
on fracking at the time, and the state has since banned the practice
altogether. 61

Id. at 679, 725-26
55.
56.
Id. at 688.
57.
Id. at 584-85, 689-90.
58.
Id. at 689-90.
59.
See Katie Colaneri, Pennsylvaniatowns with no zoning rules unlikely to limit
gas drilling, STATE IMPACT, https://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2014/02/11/patowns-with-no-zoning-rules-unlikely-to-limit-gas-drilling-2/
[https://perma.cc/X387W2PW] (archived Oct. 21, 2017); Alex Wolf, PennsylvaniaCases Could Pave ClearerPath
For Local Fracking Laws, LAW360, https://www.1aw360.com/articles/848756/pa-casescould-pave-clearer-path-for-local-fracking-laws [https://perma.cc/MV34-VZ6A] (archived
Oct. 21, 2017) ("But while the rulings in the so-called Robinson Township case may have
given municipalities the right to determine where drilling activities can take place, they
did not give local governments the power to ban fracking-related operations
altogether[.]").
60.
See, e.g., Swepi, 81 F. Supp. 3d at 1093-94 (ban by New Mexico county); City
of Longmont Colo., 369 P.3d at 577 (ban by Colorado municipality); State ex rel.
Morrison, 37 N.E.2d at 133 (ban by Ohio municipality).
61.
In In re Wallach, the Court held that state law merely preempts local
governments from regulating the manner in which oil and gas activity occurs, leaving

them free to determine the location, 16 N.E.3d at 1199, or even to disallow the activity.
Id. at 1202. The Court acknowledged that the state could take away that power at any
time, id. at 1202-03, but, as a practical matter, there was no need for the state to do so.
The state had already issued a moratorium on fracking, and decided soon after this
opinion was issued to ban fracking altogether. See Nicholas St. Fleur, The Alarming
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Another way in which local governments can influence
development is by imposing "exactions" on developers as a condition
for granting land-use approvals. A municipality might, for example,
ask a developer to set aside part of its land for a public park or street,
or to pay fees to cover the cost of providing public services to the
development. 6 2 Yet local governments must be careful when imposing
exactions, because developers may challenge them as uncompensated
takings in violation of the Takings Clause of the US Constitution.6 3
The US Supreme Court has developed a strict framework for
evaluating exactions under the Takings Clause, known as the NollanDolan test. Under that framework, the municipality must demonstrate
a rational nexus between the exaction and the project's anticipated
negative impacts, as well as a "rough proportionality" between the
burden on the developer and the impacts. 64 In essence, the exactions
must be narrowly tailored to address project impacts; the government
cannot impose conditions simply to enhance community welfare. 65
As this discussion has shown, local governments in the United
States have several means at their disposal to influence development
and secure benefits but are also held in check in important ways by
higher authorities.
2.

Developments Around the World

As in the United States, local governments abroad are
increasingly exercising regulatory powers and benefiting from
revenue-sharing mandates. Many local governments have acquired

Research Behind New York's FrackingBan, ATLANTIC (Dec. 19, 2014) (discussing the
2008 moratorium and 2014 ban).
62.
See JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § G17.03(1)(a) (3d
ed. 2016) (an exaction occurs when "the local government has required that a developer
actually transfer something of value to the government as a condition of development
approval" such as "the dedication of land or easements or the payment of fees"); PETER
S. SALSICH, JR. & TIMOTHY J. TRYNIECKI, LAND USE REGULATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS AND
PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF LAND USE LAW (3d ed. 2015) (summarizing types of

exactions).
63.
See, e.g., B.A.M. Dev., L.L.C. v. Salt Lake County, 128 P.3d 1161, 1163 (Utah
2006) (takings challenge to county decision to condition approval of residential
subdivision on dedication of property to widen traffic artery); Stephen L. Kling, Jr. et al.,
Zoning as a Tool of Land Use Control: An Analysis of the Use of Zoning as a Land Use
Control, 64 J. MO. B. 230, 234 (2008) (discussing takings challenges to zoning regulations
and explaining that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment is applicable to local
zoning regulations through the Fourteenth Amendment).
64.
See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994); Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 838 (1987); SALSICH & TRYNIECKI, supra note 62, at 41822 (summarizing the Nollan-Dolanframework and case law applying the same).
65.
See Lin, supra note 35, at 363 ("Takings doctrine limits the exactions a local
government may demand . . . Thus, exactions typically focus on ameliorating negative
externalities rather than providing affirmative incentives to local communities.").
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these rights and powers only recently, through "decentralization"
processes in vogue internationally. 66
a.

The Decentralization Trend

In countries all over the world, higher authorities have
transferred powers and revenues to lower authorities in an effort to
improve governance and achieve a more equitable sharing of benefits. 6 7
Many have done so at the urging of international donors, United
Nations bodies, and theorists, who have lauded decentralization as a
means to promote sustainable development by bringing decision
making closer to those affected by decisions.68 This embrace of
decentralization is notably reflected in Agenda 21,69 the action plan for
implementing the Rio Declaration, a soft-law instrument adopted by
more than 170 countries in 1992.70 Notably, Agenda 21 called on states
to promote sustainable development through "increased local control of

66.
See Allen L. Clark, Government Decentralisation and Resource Revenue
Sharing, in INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE MINERAL LAW AND POLICY: TRENDS AND
PROSPECTS, supra note 1, at 549 ("The process of government decentralisation and
resource revenue sharing, as part of fiscal decentralisation, is developing rapidly
internationally [.]").
67.

See WORLD BANK INDEPENDENT EVALUATION GROUP, supra note 27, at xiii

("The main reasons for [decentralization] reforms are often political, but governments
also adopt them as a way to improve service delivery and local governance."); Laura A.
German et al., Forest Governance and Decentralization in Africa: Linking Local,
Regional, and Global Dialogues, in GOVERNING AFRICA'S FORESTS IN A GLOBALIZED

WORLD 1 (Laura Anne German, Alain Karsenty & Anne Marie Tiani eds., 2009) ("Many
countries embarked on decentralization in response to demands for better management
of natural resources, including forests, and for more equitable sharing of benefits derived
from them.").
68.

See

DEVOLUTION

Introduction, in LOCAL

POLICIES

1

(David

FOREST MANAGEMENT:

Edmunds

&

Eva

THE IMPACTS

Wollenberg

eds.,

OF

2003)

("Environmentalists painted images of sustainable resource management based on an

intimate economic and cultural connection between local people and natural resources,
as well as images of more effective resource protection by those living in close proximity
to natural resources."); Peter Oosterveer & Bas Van Vliet, Environmental Systems and
Local Actors: Decentralizing Environmental Policy in Uganda, 45 ENVTL. MGMT. 284,
287 (2010) (in Uganda, international donors "made decentralization a condition for the
release of grants or loans."); Jesse C. Ribot, Arun Agrawal & Anne M. Larson,
Recentralizing While Decentralizing:How National Governments ReappropriateForest
Resources, 34 WORLD DEV. 1864, 1865 (2006) ("Governments, donors, NGOs, and

theorists typically defend decentralization reforms on grounds of improved efficiency,
equity, and responsiveness of bureaucracies to citizen demands.").
69.
U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda 21, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26 (June 1992) [hereinafter Agenda 21].
70.
U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), Annex I (Aug. 12,
1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration]; Stathis N. Palassis, Beyond the Global Summits:
Reflecting on the EnvironmentalPrinciplesof SustainableDevelopment, 22 COLO. J. INT'L
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 41, 47-48 (2011) (discussing the adoption of these instruments).
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resources, local institution-strengthening and capacity-building." 7
Agenda 21 also contemplated "a community-driven approach to
sustainability," which should include "[g]iving communities a large
measure of participation in the sustainable management and
International
of the local natural resources [.]"72
protection
instruments building on the Rio Declaration since then have continued
to recognize an important role for local authorities in sustainable
development.73
At the same time, some decentralization processes have been
driven in part by pressures from below, as communities have
demanded more input into decision making or a greater share of
benefits. 74
Some such demands have been fueled by environmental or social
impacts of development activity. In the Philippines, for example, largescale development projects under the highly centralized Marcos regime
in the 1970s and 1980s caused widespread environmental degradation
and contributed to the rise of community resistance movements.7 5
After Marcos fell from power, local interests pressured the Corazon
Aquino administration to give them more say in decision making over
development and a greater share of benefits.76 The resulting Local

71.
Agenda 21, supra note 69, ¶ 3.4.
72.
Id. t 3.7
73.
See, e.g., Rio+20: United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development,
Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 20-22, 2012, The Future We Want, ¶ 42, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/66/288 (July 27, 2012) ("We ... recognize the important role that [local]
authorities and communities can play in implementing sustainable development."); id.
T 193 ("[W]e commit to improving the livelihoods of people and communities by creating
the conditions needed for them to sustainably manage forests, ... particularly decisionmaking and benefit sharing, in accordance with national legislation and priorities.").
See Clark, supra note 66, at 558 (in the Philippines and Indonesia
74.
decentralization occurred in response to "massive public demonstrations for a greater
role in government decision-making through decentralisation and for resource revenue

sharing, the latter led particularly by the resource-rich provinces of each nation");
Introduction, in LOCAL FOREST MANAGEMENT: THE IMPACTS OF DEVOLUTION POLICIES,

supra note 68, at 2 ("Popular protest at the shortcomings of centralized policies ... also
forced government officials in some countries to re-evaluate their position on who should
be responsible for forest management.").
75.
See Francisco A. Magno, Environmental Movements in the Philippines, in
ASIA'S ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 143, 149 (Yok-shiu

F. Lee & Alvin Y. So eds., 1999) (explaining that during the Marcos era "Philippine
environmental activism was fueled by threats to local people and nature generated by
environmentally high-impact projects," and providing examples); Alma OcampoSalvador, Environmental Governance in the Philippines, PHILIPPINE GOVERNANCE

REPORT 11 (2002), http://www.ombudsman.gov.ph/UNDP4/philippine-governancereportlindex.html [https://perma.ccUX24-PYYN] (archived Oct. 21, 2017).
76.
See Ledivina V. Carifio, Devolution toward Democracy: Lessons for Theory
and Practice from the Philippines, in DECENTRALIzING GOVERNANCE:

EMERGING

CONCEPTS AND PRACTICES 92, 103 (G. Shabbir Cheema & Dennis A. Rondinelli eds.,
2007); Ocampo-Salvador, supra note 75, at 15-16 (describing the impact of local activism
on

Aquino

administration

policy,

including

community-based

natural

resource
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Government Code (LGC) expanded local governments' taxing powers,
gave them a specified share of revenues from natural resource
development, and increased their share of national taxes.7 7 The LGC
also required national agencies to consult with and obtain consent of
local governments before undertaking any project that poses
substantial environmental risk.7 8 In addition, the LGC gave local
governments new regulatory powers in areas such as forestry
management, mining, and environmental protection.7 9 Nevertheless,
it was not until an environmental disaster in 1996 at a mine regulated
by the central government that local governments began to use their
new powers fully. Galvanized by growing community fears about the
risks of mining, several local governments opted to withhold their
consent to mining proposals or passed ordinances prohibiting mining
within their territory.8 0
In other cases, local demands for decentralization have been
spurred by a desire to secure a greater share of benefits. In Bolivia, for
example, the central government devolved significant powers and
revenues to local authorities in the mid-1990s in response to pressures
from local interests seeking greater access to, and benefits from,
natural resources.8 1 Subsequently, after the discovery of extensive new

management); Joseph Siegle & Patrick O'Mahony, Assessing the Merits of
Decentralization as a Conflict Mitigation Strategy, USAID OFF. DEMOCRACY AND
GOVERNANCE 39-40 (2006) (in light of community resistance movements,
"decentralization was seen as a principal means to improve security by bringing
government closer to the people").
77.
See Siegle & O'Mahony, supra note 76, at 40.
78.
See William N. Holden & R. Daniel Jacobson, MiningAmid Decentralization.
Local Governments and Mining in the Philippines, 30 NAT. RESOURCES F. 188, 192-93
(summarizing LGC provisions); Varsha Venugopal, Thinking Locally: Community
Consultation in the Philippines, NAT. RESOURCE GOVERNANCE INST. 2 (April 2016),
http://www.resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/thinking-locallyOct.
21,
2017)
(last
visited
community-consultation-in-the-philippines.pdf
[https://perma.ccL4MZ-D3D2] (archived Oct. 21, 2017).
79.
See Boris Verbrugge, Decentralization,InstitutionalAmbiguity, and Mineral
Resource Conflict in Mindanao, Philippines, 67 WORLD DEV. 449, 453 (2015)
(summarizing the new powers that the LGC provided).
80.
See Venugopal, supranote 78, at 2 ("Events reached a turning point in March
1996 following the tailings spill at the Marcopper Mining Corporation mine which filled
the 26-kilometer Boac River on the island of Marinduque with 3-4 million tons of metalenriched and acid-generating tailings. ... [S]ince the disaster local governments have
used the code provisions more frequently to oppose mining activities[J").
See Ribot, Agrawal & Larson, supra note 68, at 1874 (asserting that the
81.
devolution of powers and revenues to local authorities in Bolivia was a "response to
regional movements demanding local access to forests and timber royalties since the
1970s."); Gonzalo SAnchez de Lozada & Jean-Paul Faguet, Why I DecentralizedBolivia,
in Is DECENTRALIZATION GOOD FOR DEVELOPMENT?: PERSPECTIVES FROM ACADEMICS

AND POLICY MAKERS, supra note 6, at 31, 41-44 (explaining that demands in Santa Cruz
and other departments for "a bigger and bigger piece of the pie" drove the
decentralization that occurred in Bolivia in the early 1990s).
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natural gas deposits in that country, 82 movements developed in the
resource-rich regions seeking exclusive control over local resources.8 3
In response, the central government agreed to devolve further powers
to subnational authorities but insisted on retaining ultimate control
84
over resource development.
Decentralization has also sometimes been fueled in part by ethnic,
religious, or linguistic divisions, as minority groups have sought
greater autonomy from central regimes dominated by majority
groups. 85 In Spain, for example, the central government sought to
defuse separatist demands in Catalonia and the Basque Region by
dividing the country into seventeen autonomous communities and two
autonomous cities. 86 These autonomous bodies acquired new
regulatory powers in areas such as land use planning and
environmental protection, as well as mandated shares of governmental
revenues.87

82.

See Thomas

Perreault,

Extracting Justice: Natural Gas, Indigenous

Mobilization, and the Bolivian State, in THE POLITICS OF RESOURCE EXTRACTION:
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE STATE 75, 76 (Suzana

Sawyer & Edmund Terence Gomez eds., 2012) (asserting that new discoveries increased
Bolivia's proven gas reserves thirty-fold between 1996 and 2002).
See Franz Chdvez, Bolivia: The Complex Process of Designing a New State,
83.
INTER PRESS SERVICE (Mar. 21, 2007) (observing that Bolivia's natural gas reserves are
concentrated in the eastern and southern regions and that "civic leaders in the eastern
provinces want greater local control over the administration of natural resources and the
taxes levied on them."); Mohit Joshi, In Political Unrest, Looters Target Bolivian
Telecoms, TV Offices, TOP NEWS, Sept. 11, 2008 (describing protests against the state's
taxation of local natural gas, and noting that "citizens in four provinces have approved
referenda, by large margins, for greater autonomy from the national government, which
would grant them control over key natural resources").
84.
See La Paz Opts For New Constitution, Cements Control Over Resources, BMI
AMERICAS OIL & GAS INSIGHTS (Jan. 27, 2009) (describing Bolivia's new constitution,

which grants "more autonomy to the country's nine regions," but also enshrines "state
control over Bolivia's natural resources."); Multiple Challenges To Stability, With Or
Without Morales, BUS. MONITOR ONLINE (Oct. 2015) ("Morales initially refused the
autonomy demands of the eastern regions . . . however, following international
mediation, Morales agreed to grant the eastern regions more autonomy in the 2009
constitution.").
See Rodriguez-Pose & Gill, supra note 6, at 338 ("Regions and states with
85.
their own ethnic, historical, cultural, or linguistic identity have paved the way for
decentralization.").
86.

See DAVID STOREY, TERRITORIES: THE CLAIMING OF SPACE 89 (2d ed. 2012)

(asserting that the creation of autonomous communities was a response to separatist
pressures and was "designed to stave off the disintegration of the Spanish state").
87.
See N6ria Bosch & Jos6 M. Durin, The Financing System of Spanish
Regions: Main Features, Weak Points and Possible Reforms, in FISCAL FEDERALISM AND
POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION: LESSONS FROM SPAIN, GERMANY AND CANADA 3-6 (Ndria

Bosch & Jos6 M. Durdn eds., 2008) (summarizing the powers and revenues devolved to
the autonomous bodies); Covadonga Del Pozo & Maria Soto, Spain, in INTERNATIONAL
COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDES: ENVIRONMENT & CLIMATE CHANGE LAW 2017 § 1.1,
http://www.iclg.co.uk/practice-areas/environment-and-climate-changelaw/environment-and-climate-change-law-2016/spain
[https://perma.cc/GZV4-BGCTI
(archived Oct. 21, 2017) (summarizing the autonomous bodies' regulatory powers).
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In some countries, a combination of these factors has played a role
in the decentralization process. Indonesia provides a case in point. In
that country, the central government adopted a sweeping series of
decentralization measures in 1999 in the face of separatist movements
in minority-group regions. These movements were fueled not only by
ethnic or religious divisions, but also by resentment over
environmental degradation and limited sharing by the central
government of revenues derived from natural resource development."8
As the central government struggled to deal with these pressures,
international donors supported decentralization as a potential
solution. 89 The decentralization measures that the central government
ultimately adopted gave local governments substantial new powers
and revenues.9 0 Among other things, local governments secured
control over the issuing of permits for natural resource development
and environmental enforcement,9 1 as well as specified shares of tax
revenues collected from resource development. 9 2
b.

Results of Decentralization

The results of decentralization processes to date have been mixed.
On the one hand, local authorities have used their newfound powers to

. 88.
See CHRISTOPHER M. BARR ET AL., DECENTRALIZATION OF FOREST
ADMINISTRATION IN INDONESIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREST SUSTAINABILITY, ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, AND COMMUNITY LIVELIHOODS 18-28 (2006) (describing the historical
background to decentralization in Indonesia, and noting that "policies and practices
employed by the [central] government to secure timber rents for elites at the national
level generated deep resentment among stakeholders in forested regions[,]" which had
experienced "unprecedented rates of deforestation and forestry degradation"); id. at 68
("Demands from regional stakeholders for a more equitable share of natural resource
revenues have been a significant driving factor behind Indonesia's decentralization
process. In the years leading up to the 1999 regional autonomy law, some of the most
vociferous demands came from stakeholders in the resource-rich provinces ... [each of
which] had a long-standing separatist insurgency[]"); Akpan, supra note 1 at 291-93
(discussing the impact of separatist movements in Aceh, Irian Jaya, and Riau on the
central government's decision to decentralize).
89.
See MICHELLE ANN MILLER, REBELLION AND REFORM IN INDONESIA:
JAKARTA'S SECURITY AND AUTONOMY POLICIES IN ACEH 45 (2008) ("[T]he Indonesian

government consulted the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
throughout the drafting of Indonesia's autonomy laws, which both institutions supported
as a way of strengthening local institutional capacity and building good governance.").
See Akpan, supra note 1, at 291-96 (summarizing new powers granted to
90.
local authorities by the Indonesian state in response to local struggles for resource
control).
See John McCarthy & Zahari Zen, Regulating the Oil Palm Boom: Assessing
91.
the Effectiveness of Environmental Governance Approaches to Agro-industrialPollution
in Indonesia, 32 L. & POL'Y 153, 163 (2010) ("In effect, the districts and municipal

governments now have most of the responsibilities for environmental management and
monitoring.").
See Akpan, supra note 1, at 295-96.
92.
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extract benefits from developers in the form of taxes, fees, or
infrastructure improvements, 9 3 and have sometimes shared those
benefits broadly across communities. 94 Some local governments have
also used their powers to enhance regulatory frameworks or secure
project modifications to mitigate environmental and social risks.9 5 On
the other hand, scholars have reported a deterioration in
environmental standards and a rush to develop resources in some
countries following decentralization. 9 6 Capture of community benefits
by corrupt local elites has also occurred in some countries.9 7
Decentralization has also sometimes created or exacerbated economic
inequalities among communities within a region or between parts of
the country-with resource-rich areas faring better than resource-poor
ones.9 8 In addition, social conflict has sometimes erupted among local
groups competing for benefits.9 9
Whether in response to these issues or simply to protect their own
interests, some central governments have taken steps to reverse or
undermine decentralization processes.1 0 0 In particular, some have
delayed transferring powers or revenues that they committed to

See Venugopal, supra note 78, at 3 (discussing taxes and fees imposed by
93.
local governments on mining companies in the Philippines pursuant to the LGC).
94.
See, e.g., Phil Ren6 Oyono, The Social and OrganisationalRoots of Ecological
Uncertainties in Cameroon's Forest Management Decentralisation Model, in
DEMOCRATIC DECENTRALISATION THROUGH A NATURAL RESOURCE LENS 174, 183 (Jesse

C. Ribot & Anne M. Larson eds., 2005); Charles Palmer & Stefanie Engel, For Better or
for Worse? Local Impacts of the Decentralizationof Indonesia'sForest Sector, 35 WORLD
DEV. 2131, 2138 (2007) (asserting that in parts of Indonesia "[tihe percentage of
households per community that received financial benefits [from timber harvesting]
significantly increased from an average of one percent before decentralization to over
90% afterward").
95.
See Ribot, Agrawal & Larson, supra note 68, at 1876; Venugopal, supra note
78, at 3 (asserting that, post-decentralization, local governments in the Philippines have
established new safeguards against environmental degradation).
See, e.g., Coleman & Fleischman, supra note 28, at 839-40 (asserting that
96.
decentralization has sometimes led to localized benefits which are out of harmony with
the broader policy goals (e.g., short term economic benefits from timber extraction which
improves local livelihoods, but at the expense of the broader goals of sustainability)").
See Oyono, supra note 94, at 184; Palmer & Engel, supra note 94, at 2136
97.
(describing local rent-seeking, corruption and elite capture following decentralization in
Indonesia).

See Clark, supra note 66, at 564 (asserting that Indonesia's revenue-sharing
98.
framework has exacerbated economic disparities among different regions and
municipalities); Priscilla Schwartz, Corporate Activities and Environmental Justice:
Perspectiveson SierraLeone's Mining, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND JUSTICE IN CONTEXT

429, 438 (Jonas Ebbesson & Phoebe Okowa eds., 2009) (explaining that benefits have
been distributed unevenly among inhabitants of some mining communities in Sierra
Leone, resulting in social discord).
99.
See Verbrugge, supra note 79, at 457 (describing conflicts between local
groups in the Philippines over resource royalties).
See Ribot, Agrawal & Larson, supra note 68, at 1865 (describing such
100.
measures and asserting that they are sometimes taken by central authorities "to
preserve their own interests and powers").
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transfer,10 1 enacted new laws or decrees that contradict prior
devolutions of authority, 102 or questioned the validity of actions taken
by lower governments pursuant to devolved powers.
For example, despite language in the LGC requiring consent from
local governments for mining projects, the central government in the
Philippines has disputed local governments' authority to withhold
consent. In 2012, after several local governments attempted to do so,
President Benigno S. Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 79,
declaring that local governments must restrict themselves to "the
imposition of reasonable limitations on mining activities .

.

. that are

consistent with national laws and regulations."10 3 The same year, his
Department of Justice issued an opinion asserting that local
governments do not have the legal authority to ban mining. 104 One
scholar has described these actions as seeking to "confirm the primacy
of national government laws over local ordinances . . . as part of a

broader attempt on the part of the current administration to
recentralize control over mineral wealth."10 5
B. EIA Requirements and Public Participationin Environmental
Decision Making and Enforcement
As local governments have expanded their regulatory roles and
revenues-subject, in some cases, to pushback from higher
authorities-communities and stakeholders have secured further

See id. at 1876 (asserting that-despite laws purporting to allow local
101.
governments in Nicaragua to "control the rational use of the environment and natural
resources" and giving them a right to 25% of the tax income from natural resource
contracts-the central government often awards such contracts unilaterally and fails to
transfer the required funds).
See Akpan, supra note 1, at 293-95 (explaining that after the Indonesian
102.
state passed a law giving local governments the power to issue permits for particular
investment activities, the state enacted regulations empowering the state to grant the
main licenses for certain projects); Palmer & Engel, supra note 94, at 2133 (asserting
that, after legislation granted local governments in Indonesia the authority to issue
logging permits, the Ministry of Forestry suspended that authority).
103.
Institutionalizing and Implementing Reforms in the Philippine Mining
Sector, Providing Policies and Guidelines to Ensure Environmental Protection and
Responsible Mining in the Utilization of Mineral Resources, Exec. Ord. No. 79, § 12
(Phil.).
2012
(Phil),
No.
87
s.
Opinion
Dep't
of
Justice,
104.
See
http://www.intexresources.com.ph/mindoronickellindex htmlfiles/DOJ%200pinion%2
087-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/FEN8-G75F] (archived Oct. 21, 2017); Edu Punay, LGUs
Prohibiting Open Pit Mining May Face Sanctions, PHIL. STAR, Nov. 26, 2012 (the
Department of Justice "supported the plan of the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG) to impose administrative sanctions on local government units
(LGUs) that continue to prohibit open pit mining").
Verbrugge, supra note 79, at 454.
105.

-
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influence through the rise of EIAs and opportunities for public
participation in environmental matters. 106
1.

Developments in the United States

Innovations in the United States gave rise to both the EIA
phenomenon and multilayered participation rights for affected
communities and individuals: access to information, participation in
decision making, and access to justice.
a.

The US EIA Regime

In 1969, Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), which established a requirement for federal agencies to
evaluate the environmental impacts of development projects or other
actions that implicate significant federal responsibility. 0 7 The statute
was a response to public demands for reform in the wake of the 1969
Santa Barbara oil spill and other events that raised awareness of the
potential environmental and social costs of development. 0 8 Legislative
history suggests that Congress enacted NEPA to address perceived
deficiencies in agency decision making and "restore public confidence
in the Federal Government's capacity to achieve important public
purposes and objectives and at the same time to maintain and enhance
the quality of the environment."10 9
Under NEPA, unless a proposed action falls within a statutory or
regulatory exclusion, the responsible agency must undertake an
environmental assessment (EA) before approving the action.1 10 An EA

&

106.
See George (Rock) Pring & Susan Y. No6, The EmergingInternationalLaw
of Public ParticipationAffecting Global Mining, Energy, and Resources Development, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 11, 38 (Donald N. Zillman et al.
eds., 2002) (discussing the rise of EIAs and associated participation requirements).
107.
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852
(1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2012)); see also Todd S. Aagaard,
A FunctionalApproach to Risks and Uncertainties Under NEPA, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL.
ADMIN. L. 87, 91-92 (2012) (summarizing NEPA's requirements).
108.
Bradley C. Karkkainen, NEPA and the Curious Evolution of Environmental
Impact Assessment in the United States, in TAKING STOCK OF ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT: LAw, POLICY AND PRACTICE 45, 51-52 (Jane Holder & Donald McGillivray
eds., 2007) (summarizing circumstances leading to NEPA's adoption); 115 Cong. Rec.
40,422 (1969) (statement of Sen. Allott) ("[B]y enactment of this measure, the Congress
is not giving the American people something, rather the Congress is responding to the
demands of the American people.").
109.
Daniel J. White, When There Are No Adverse Effects: Protecting the
Environment from the Misapplicationof NEPA, 71 A.F. L. REV. 107, 139 (2014) (quoting
S. Rep No. 91-296, at 8).
110.
See John Travis Marshall, Weathering NEPA Review: Superstorms and
Super Slow Urban Recovery, 41 ECOLOGY L. Q. 81, 91-92 (2014) (summarizing
categorical exclusions and circumstances under which an EA must be performed).
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is a relatively cursory investigation into whether or not the action has
the potential to cause significant adverse environmental effects. 1 1 ' If
the agency determines that the effects of a proposed action will not be
significant, then it issues a "finding of no significant impact" (FONSI)
and ends the review.1 12 If, however, the agency concludes that the
effects will be significant, then it must undertake a much more
comprehensive investigation and prepare an environmental impact
statement (EIS).1 13 An EIS is a formal written statement that
discusses the purpose and need for the proposed action, describes the
environment that will be affected, analyzes the environmental
impacts, and considers alternatives to the proposed action. 114
NEPA does not mandate any particular outcome, leaving agencies
free to approve or reject actions notwithstanding impacts identified in
an EIS. The statute does, however, require agencies to take a "hard
look" at the environmental consequences of their decisions.11 5
Moreover, when preparing an EIS the responsible agency must
consider not only potential impacts on the physical environment but
also social and economic impacts. 116 This gives local communities a
form of indirect influence: the responsible agency must disclose and
analyze how communities could be affected by the proposed action.
b.

Access to Information
Decision Making

and Participation

in

Environmental

NEPA implementing regulations also provide more direct avenues
of community influence by establishing opportunities for members of

111.
See id. at 92 ("[an EA] serves an exploratory purpose"); see also White, supra
note 109, at 114-15 (describing EAs).
112.
See Whether to Prepare Environmental Impact Statement, 40 C.F.R. §
1501.4(e) (1978) (criteria for issuance of a FONSI); see also Kevin T. Haroff, On Thin Air:
Standing, Climate Change, and the National Environmental Policy Act, 46 VAL. U. L.
REV. 411, 417 (2012) (explaining when FONSIs may be issued).
See Haroff, supra note 112, at 417 ("If no categorical exclusion applies, and
113.
issuance of a FONSI cannot be justified, the agency ordinarily must prepare an EIS.");
White, supra note 109, at 114-15 (comparing the difference between an EA and an EIS).
114.
42 U.S.C. § 4332 (statutory basis for the EIS requirement); Haroff, supra
note 112, at 417 (summarizing issues typically addressed in an EIS).
115.
Aagaard, supranote 107, at 92 ("NEPA'require[s] that agencies take a 'hard
look' at environmental consequences.' But NEPA's requirements are procedural, not
substantive. So long as 'the adverse environmental effects of the proposed action are
adequately identified and evaluated, the agency is not constrained by NEPA from
deciding that other values outweigh the environmental costs."').
116.
GRAD, supra note 36, § 9.02 ("NEPA itself clearly requires that the
environmental impact statement includes social, economic, and other non-physical
impacts.");

5-120

DAVID

J. MUCHOW & WiLLIAM A.

MOGEL, ENERGY LAW AND

TRANSACTIONS § 120.02 (2016) ("If an EIS is prepared and economic or social effects are
'interrelated' with natural and physical effects, the EIS must discuss 'all of these effects
on the human environment."') (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1508.14).
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the public to participate in the review process.11 7 In particular,
regulations promulgated by the Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ)-an executive body established by NEPA-require agencies to
encourage public participation in the EIS process from the earliest
possible time; take prescribed steps to notify interested parties and
make relevant materials available to the public; and hold public
hearings whenever appropriate.1 18 These requirements are designed to
improve agency decision making by giving officials input from
interested parties, as well as to increase the legitimacy of decisions.1 19
Notably, however, some opportunities for public participation do
not arise unless the responsible agency decides to undertake an EIS.120
Yet the agency does not have to prepare an EIS if it finds-in the
threshold EA-that the action will have no significant impacts. And
agencies have a distinct incentive to make such a finding, because
preparing an EIS is extremely expensive and time-consuming. 121
Another limiting factor is that decision makers do not have to
credit whatever comments are offered by members of the public.
Although agencies must consider comments received and respond to
them,1 22 the comments do not necessarily impact the ultimate outcome.
Even if a majority of an affected community opposes a proposal, the
responsible agency can still approve it; affected communities do not
have a veto.1 23

PANEL ON PUB. PARTICIPATION IN ENVTL. ASSESSMENT & DECISION MAKING
117.
THE NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT AND DECISION MAKING 37 (Thomas Dietz & Paul C. Stern' eds., 2008)
&

[hereinafter Dietz & Stern] (describing public participation opportunities).
118.
40 C.F.R. § 1506.6 (2017) (requirements for public involvement); GRAD,
supra note 36, § 9.03 (summarizing the public participation requirements set forth in the
CEQ regulations); Peter Eddie Aldinger, Addressing Environmental Justice Concerns in
Developing Countries: Mining in Nigeria, Uganda and Ghana, 26 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L.
REV. 345, 362 (2014) (same).
119.
Dietz & Stern, supra note 117, at 49-50 (citing evidence that public
participation and local knowledge can improve the quality of decision making); id. at 50
(federal agencies see public participation "as a means of making their decisions more
broadly acceptable to the public"); Amy L. Major, Foxes Guarding the Henhouse: How to
ProtectEnvironmental StandingFrom a ConservativeSupreme Court, 36 ENVTL. L. REP.
10698, 10708 (2006) ("[T]hrough NEPA's informational and procedural requirements,
Congress sought to utilize public participation as a way of achieving environmental
protection and demonstrated its commitment to public involvement in oversight of
agency actions under the Act.").
120.
See Elizabeth Burleson, CooperativeFederalism and Hydraulic Fracturing:
A Human Right to a Clean Environment, 22 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 289, 298-99
(2012) (discussing the importance of an EIS for fulsome public participation).
121.
Raefe Peterson, Environmental Law Update, 24 PROBATE & PROPERTY 54
(2010) ("[T]here is considerable benefit to reaching a finding of 'no significant impact' if
for no other reason than the time and resources it takes to prepare an EIS.").
122.
ROHAN & KELLY, supranote 40, § 24.03 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1503.4 (2017)).
123.
Alice Kaswan, Distributive Justice and the Environment, 81 N.C. L. REV.
1031, 1128-29 (2003) ("So long as the public is allowed to participate, the decision-maker
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Studies have shown that decision makers are most likely to be
swayed by highly technical comments that emanate from experts,
usually involving scientific or economic issues.12 4 This places members
of the general public at a disadvantage in any attempt to influence
decision making. That disadvantage can be particularly pronounced for
members of low-income and minority communities, who are less likely
to be able to hire experts and more likely to face linguistic and
educational constraints. 125
Despite these limitations, public input does sometimes influence
agency decision making. 126 Such input was likely a factor, for example,
in the Obama administration's denial of a permit required for the
Keystone XL Pipeline-a project to bring crude oil from the Oil Sands
of Canada to refineries in the United States.1 27 During the review.
process, the State Department received millions of comments from
citizens, community groups, Native American tribes, and local
governments. 128 Many of these raised concerns about potential
environmental or social impacts of the project, including the risk that
oil spills would pollute the Ogallala Aquifer and threaten the health of
local communities.' 2 9 After this "unprecedented" outpouring of

is free to decide where and how to locate a facility, without regard to the sentiments
expressed in the public participation process.").
124.
Nicholas A. Fromherz, From Consultation to Consent: Community Approval
as a Prerequisiteto Environmentally Significant Projects, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 109, 143
(2013) ("[T]he input that makes a difference-the input that agencies and courts creditis largely the stuff of expertise.").
125.
See id. at 142 ("To influence the process, non-governmental actors-be they
citizen groups, NGOs, think tanks, industry representatives, etc.-must command
resources to which many ordinary people do not have access."); Case, supra note 24, at
718 ("Problems such as literacy or language barriers, obscure or untimely official notices,
and documents in technical and highly specialized language create serious accessibility
obstacles to participation for environmental justice communities.").
126.
See Marc B. Mihaly, Citizen Participationin the Making of Environmental
Decisions:Evolving Obstacles and PotentialSolutions Through Partnershipwith Experts
and Agents, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 151, 167 (2009) ("The quantity, unilateral nature,
or vehemence of citizen testimony may sway a decision-maker in marginal or heavily

politicized settings, especially where the ultimate decision-maker is comprised of elected
officials.").
127.
Cindy S. Woods, The Great Sioux Nation v. The "Black Snake"` Native
American Rights and the Keystone XL Pipeline, 22 BUFF. Hum. RTS..L. REV. 67, 68-73
(2016) (describing the Keystone XL project proposal and the application process, from
inception to denial of the permit).
128.
Department of State Record of Decision and National Interest
Determination, TransCanada Keystone Pipeline, L.P. Application for Presidential
Permit at 4-5 (Nov. 3, 2015), http://keystonepipeline-x.state.gov/documents/
(archived Oct. 23, 2017)
organization/249450.pdf [https://perma.cc/RZ2J-WH43]
[hereinafter Department of State Record of Decision] (noting more than 1.5 million public
comments in response to the Draft Supplemental EIS, and more than three million in
response to the Final Supplemental EIS).
129.
Id. at 13-17.
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opposition, the State Department denied the permit-expressly
acknowledging that community concerns were one basis for the
decision.13 0 Although the State Department indicated that a "key
consideration" was a desire to send a message that the United States
was taking steps to reduce dependence on fossil fuels,13 1 the Obama
administration approved a different cross-border pipeline carrying the
same Oil Sands crude. 13 2 An important factor that distinguished the
Keystone XL Pipeline was the widespread, grassroots opposition.13 3
And while President Trump has since approved the Keystone XL
Pipeline,1 34 community concerns have already prompted one route
modification after he did so, and the ultimate fate of the project
133
remains to be seen.
c.

Access to Justice

Members of the public in the United States have also acquired
opportunities to participate in the enforcement of environmental laws.
One such opportunity is the right to challenge an agency's
perceived failure to comply with NEPA's procedural requirements.
NEPA does not provide a private right of action, but members of the
public may bring suit against the responsible agency under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).1 36 For example, citizens have
agencies'
FONSI
APA to challenge
filed suit under the

Id. at 5 (describing the volume of comments as "unprecedented"); id. at 30
130.
(listing, among the factors that contributed to the decision, "the concerns of some Indian
tribes . . . regarding cultural sites and avoidance of adverse impacts to the environment,
including to surface and groundwater resources").
Id. at 31.
131.
132.
David Shaffer, State a Busy Hub for Crude Oil, STAR TRIB. (Aug. 26, 2012),
at 1A (observing that "[w]hen Enbridge built its 'Alberta Clipper' pipeline to carry
Canadian crude into Minnesota, it won approval from the Obama administration in 2009
with no fanfare").

Id. (attributing the difference in outcomes for the two projects to the
133.
existence of grassroots opposition in the case of the Keystone XL Pipeline).
Brady Dennis & Steven Mufson, As Trump administrationgrants approval
134.
for Keystone XL pipeline, an old fight is reignited, WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/03/24/trump-

administration-grants-approval-for-keystone-xl-pipeline/?utmterm=.ca26bb246033
[https://perma.cc/A3MR-AXG3] (archived on Oct. 23, 2017).
Id.; see also Jillian Goodman, Can Some Nebraska FarmersKill the Keystone
135.
XL
Pipeline?,
BLOOMBERG
(Aug.
14,
2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201 7-08- 14/can-some-nebraska-farmers-killthe-keystone-xl-pipeline [https://perma.cc/45AB-GQV9] (archived Oct. 23, 2017); Adam
Wernick, The Keystone XL Pipeline Gets a Victory, but with a Question Mark, PRI (Dec.
12,
2017),
https://www.pri.org/stories/2017- 12- 12/keystone-xl-pipeline-gets-victoryquestion-mark [https://perma.cc/GJN7-NBWE] (archived on. Jan. 5, 2018).
136.

NICHOLAS A. ROBINSON, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF REAL PROPERTY

§ 4.07 (2017).
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38
determinations 3 7 or the adequacy of EISs.s
Courts generally give
39
decisions,s
but citizen plaintiffs can
substantial deference to agency
prevail when the decision plainly lacks an adequate basis. For
example, one court overturned a FONSI issued by the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) in connection with a proposed fracking operation
in the Monterey Shale Formation because the FONSI was based on an
erroneous assumption.1 4 0 Specifically, in determining that the
operation would have no significant impacts, BLM assumed that the
developer would not find oil and that no production would result.141
BLM based this assumption on the fact that prior attempts to produce
oil-using conventional methods-had failed.1 42 As the Court pointed
out, however, there were significant oil deposits in the local shale
formation and fracking is much more effective at recovering oil and gas
from shale.1 43 Consequently, BLM should have at least considered
what impacts would result if production commenced.1 44
Members of the public can also allege violations of substantive
environmental laws, most of which authorize citizen suits. 145 Such
suits can be an effective supplement to agency enforcement efforts,
stopping pollution or other harms that would likely continue
unchecked if agencies were left to their own devices.1 46 In fact,
Congress established these private rights of action because of
limitations on agency resources and the concern that agencies

137.
See Wendy B. Davis, The Fox is Guardingthe Henhouse: Enhancingthe Role
of the EPA in FONSI DeterminationsPursuant to NEPA, 39 AKRON L. REV. 35, 44-52
(2006) (summarizing case law involving citizen suit challenges to FONSI
determinations).
Haroff, supra note 112, at 417-18 (discussing citizen suits challenging the
138.
adequacy of an EIS or the manner in which it was prepared).
See Sierra Club v. Flowers, 526 F.3d 1353, 1361 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal
139.
citation omitted) ("A court can only find a federal agency's attempted NEPA compliance
inadequate where it is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion in violation of the
APA. This standard requires substantial deference to the agency ... when reviewing
decisions like what evidence to find credible and whether to issue a FONSI or EIS[.]").
Ctr. for Biological Diversity & Sierra Club v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 937 F.
140.
Supp. 2d 1140, 1155-56 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
141.
Id. at 1155.
Id.
142.
Id. at 1144-45.
143.
144.
Id. at 1155-56.
145.
Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The
Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 98-99 (2005)
(asserting that "almost every major federal environmental statute passed since 1970"
authorizes citizen suits).
146.
For an example, see Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Fola Coal Co., 120 F. Supp.
3d 509, 511-12, 542-43, 547 (S.D. W. Va. 2015) (upholding environmental NGOs' claim
that a mining company was violating federal statutes by discharging pollution into
streams from mountaintop removal coal mines in West Virginia, and establishing a
framework for permanent injunctive relief).
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environmental

Developments Around the World

EIA requirements and public participation opportunities that first
developed in the United States have since spread worldwide.
More than one hundred countries have established some form of
EIA regime modeled on NEPA,1 48 and the international community
has adopted several international instruments that incorporate EIA
norms. 149 Some of these instruments are binding, requiring member
states to conduct EIAs when considering activities that are likely to
50
or to adversely
cause significant adverse transboundary impacto
151
the environment in Antarctica, 152 or
affect the marine environment,
biological diversity.15 3 NEPA and its progeny also inspired Principle 17
of the non-binding Rio Declaration, which called for ElAs whenever
states are considering activities likely to have a significant adverse
environmental impact. 154
Most of these EIA frameworks contemplate some form of public
participation. 155 In fact, an international convention adopted in 1998
and ratified by forty-seven countries-the Aarhus Conventionrequires member states to meet minimum standards for all three forms
of public participation in environmental matters: access to

147.
Conservation Law Found. v. Browner, 840 F. Supp. 171, 174 (D. Mass. 1993)
(internal citations omitted) ("Sponsors of the Clean Air Act [citizen suit provision] were
wary of the untrustworthiness or lack of will of federal environmental agencies and the
inevitable lack of resources for those agencies to address all statutory violations.").
148.
CRAIK, supra note 10, at 23.
149.
Tseming Yang & Robert V. Percival, The Emergence of Global
EnvironmentalLaw, 36 ECOLOGY L. Q. 615, 629-30 (2009) (describing the spread of EIA
norms from NEPA to international environmental agreements and domestic laws around
the world).
150.
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary
Context art. 2(3), Feb. 25, 1991, 1989 U.N.T.S. 309.
151.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397.
152.
Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, art. 8, opened
for signatureOct. 4, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1455 (1991).
153.
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Convention
on Biological Diversity, art. 14, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992) [hereinafter CBD].
154.
Rio Declaration, supra note 70, Principle 17.
155.
CRAIK, supra note 10, at 31 ("Almost every EIA system includes some form
of public participation and consultation."); Jonas Ebbesson, Principle 10: Public
Participation, in THE RIo DECLARATION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT: A

COMMENTARY 287, 293 (Jorge E. Vifluales ed., 2015) ("[M]ost global environmental
agreements adopted since [the Rio Declaration] endorse public access to information and
public participation by some means.").
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56
information, participation in decision making, and access to justice.'
While the parties to the Aarhus Convention are currently confined to
Europe and Central Asia,' 5 7 many other countries' laws incorporate
these elements to some degree as well.' 5 8
To be sure, the mere fact that public participation opportunities
are formally established in a country's law does not nec6ssarily mean
they are effective in practice. Scholars have reported a number of
problems that can limit the effectiveness of public participation. For
example, agencies may fail to give sufficient notice or information to
the public' 59 or may seek input too late in the process. 6 0 Officials may
be corrupt or lack the capacity to use public input effectively.' 6 ' There
may also be strict standing requirements for citizen suits or limited
62
remedies available when such suits are successful.1

Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision156.
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters art. 3(1), June 25, 1998, 2161
U.N.T.S. 447 [hereinafter Aarhus Convention]; Ebbesson, supra note 155, at 298-300
(describing the Aarhus Convention's minimum standards and implementation
mechanism).
Collection,
Treaty
U.N.
Table,
Status
Convention
Aarhus
157.
https://treaties.un.org/doclPublication/MTDSG/Volume%20II/Chapter%20XXVII/XXVII
-13-a.en.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VAX-T7MY] (archived Oct. 22, 2017).
See Jos6 Juan GonzAlez MArquez, Key Regional Perspectives on Public
158.
Participation:Mexico and Central America, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN NATURAL RESOURCE
DEVELOPMENT: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF MINING
AND ENERGY RESOURCES 629, 639-46 (Donald N. Zillman et al. eds., 2002) (summarizing

access to justice mechanisms in Mexico and Central America); Jona Razzaque,
ParticipatoryRights in Natural Resource Management: The Role of Communities in
South Asia, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND JUSTICE IN CONTEXT, supra note 98, at 117-25

(describing procedures for public participation in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh);
Aldinger, supra note 118, at 364-71 (describing public participation features of EIA
legislation in Ghana, Uganda, and Nigeria).
Razzaque, supra note 158, at 130 (describing barriers to effective
159.
participation in South Asian countries); Venugopal, supra note 78, at 6 (asserting that
in the Philippines governmental authorities have sometimes refused to share documents
relating to proposed mining operations); Aldinger, supra note 118, at 367 (explaining
that in Nigeria notice is often given in writing and in English, which excludes
stakeholders who are illiterate or speak only a local language).
Aldinger, supranote 118, at 366-68 (observing that EIA processes in Ghana,
160.
Uganda and Nigeria may be well-advanced before the public has had a chance to
comment).

Razzaque, supra note 158, at 132 ("Public agencies [in India, Pakistan and
161.
Bangladesh] have limited power and resources to collect, update or disseminate
environmental information."); Schwartz, supra note 98, at 437 (asserting that problems
in Sierra Leone include "state-centric albeit uncoordinated bureaucratic processes,
corruption, ill-defined responsibilities between departments and lack of technical
capacity on the part of regulatory bodies").
See Lye Lin Heng, Public Participationin the Environment: A South-East
162.
Asian Perspective, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT: PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION IN THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF MINING AND ENERGY RESOURCES,

supra note 158, at 651, 669 (discussing a citizen suit challenging the adequacy of an EIA
for a dam dismissed on standing grounds); GonzAlez Marquez, supra note 158, at 646
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Nevertheless, as in the United States, stakeholders abroad
availing themselves of participation opportunities are sometimes able
to influence outcomes. For example, widespread community opposition
seems to have prompted provincial and federal authorities to reject the
proposed Whites Point Quarry and Marine Terminal in Nova Scotia.1 63
During the EIA process for that project, many local citizens and groups
voiced concerns about potential impacts, including contamination of
groundwater and harm to local fisheries and marine mammals.1 64 In
its report, the review panel gave considerable weight to those
comments, recommending that the project be denied because it would
be inconsistent with "core values" of the community. 165 After provincial
and federal authorities accepted the review panel's conclusion and
denied the permit, the project proponents brought a claim against
Canada under the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA).1 66 The claimants contended that the review panel deviated
from the legal standard applicable to ElAs in Canada, which focuses
on whether or not the project is likely to have significant adverse
environmental effects after mitigation-not whether or not it is
consistent with community values.1 67 A majority of the tribunal agreed
and determined that the permit denial was therefore arbitrary and
violated NAFTA.1 68 Whether or not the review panel properly
grounded its decision in the "significant adverse effects" standard,1 69

(explaining that, while a Mexican environmental law provides a private right of action
affected communities, only administrative-rather than judicial-relief is available).
163.
See Elise LeGros, Bilcon of Delaware v. Canada: NAFTA's Impact on
Environmental Assessments, 21 LAw & BUS. REV. AM. 343, 343-45 (2015) (describing the
project's review process and subsequent arbitration filed by the project proponents after
the permit denial).
164.
See Clayton v. Gov't of Canada, Case No. 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction
and Liability, ¶ 37 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015), http://www.peacases.com/web/sendAttach/1287
[https://perma.cc/45VQ-ACBS] (archived Oct. 23, 2017) [hereinafter Clayton Bilcon
Award] (the project was "a long-term industrial scale marine terminal and quarry project
in an environmentally sensitive area in which many members of the local community
expressed strong concerns and objections"); Environmental Assessment of the Whites
Point Quarry and Marine Terminal Project, Joint Review Panel Report 39, 54-55, 72
(Oct.
2007),
https://www.novascotia.calnse/ea/whitespointquarryfWhitesPointQuarryFinalReport.pd
f [https://perma.cclP2L6-EJLE] (archived Oct. 23, 2017) [hereinafter JRP Report].
165.
Clayton Bilcon Award, supra note 164, ¶ 503; JRP Report, supra note 164,
at 4.
166.
Clayton Bilcon Award, supranote 164, 1 5, 40; North American Free Trade
Agreement, Dec. 8, 1993, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993).
167.
Clayton Bilcon Award, supra note 164, ¶ 21.
168.
Id. TT 590-91, 724, 742.
169.
A dissenting arbitrator concluded that the references in the review panel's
report to "core values" of the community concerned issues properly within the panel's
mandate: potential impacts on the human environment. See Clayton v. Gov't of Canada,
Case No. 2009-04, Dissenting Opinion of Professor Donald McRae, ¶¶ 15-27 (Perm. Ct.
[https://perma.cc/2XKGArb. 2015), http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1288
BTGT] (archived Oct. 23, 2017).
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this case highlights the pressure that decision makers can feel to
respect the local popular will.
C. Development Safeguards for Indigenous and Traditional
Communities
As local interests around the world have secured new formal
opportunities to influence development, there has been growing
recognition that certain communities are uniquely vulnerable to
impacts of development and face special barriers to participationnamely, indigenous peoples and other communities that practice
traditional lifestyles. 1 70 In response to these concerns, special
safeguards for these communities have developed at both the
international and domestic levels.
1.

International Instruments and Human Rights Jurisprudence

As discussed in more detail below, the international community
has adopted a number of instruments that reflect three core safeguards
for indigenous and traditional communities vis-A-vis development.
Specifically, these instruments provide that, before undertaking or
approving development activities that may impact indigenous or
traditional communities, state authorities should: (i) conduct
comprehensive EIAs that take into account the unique circumstances
of these communities; (ii) ensure that these communities are able to
participate effectively in EIAs and other decision-making processes;
and (iii) ensure that these communities receive appropriate benefits or
compensation for any impacts that occur. This Article will refer to
these measures as the "Indigenous Development Safeguards" or
"IDSs."
The first IDS recognizes that conventional EIA regimes may not
adequately serve indigenous and traditional communities. In
particular, conventional EIA procedures may not be sufficient to
identify and evaluate social and cultural harms, which can be
particularly severe for such communities.1 71 To address these

170.
See, e.g., William M. Laurin & Joann P. Jamieson, Aligning Energy
Development with the Interests of Aboriginal Peoples in Canada, 53 ALBERTA L. REV. 453,
462 (2015) ("When compared to other communities or ethnic groups, indigenous peoples
are particularly prone to experience adverse impacts from energy development both
because they typically have a special and fundamental relationship with their 'lands and
territories,' and because they often suffer from discrimination and a systemic lack of
representation from and within government and legal institutions.").
See DAVID SZABLOWSKI, TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND LOCAL STRUGGLES:
171.
MINING, COMMUNITIES AND THE WORLD BANK 49-51 (2007) (asserting that requirements

for social and cultural impact assessment in Peruvian EIA legislation are not well-
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concerns, international instruments call for states to undertake
comprehensive EIAs before undertaking or approving any activities
that may impact an indigenous or traditional community, and some
instruments even prescribe special assessment protocols.
One such instrument was adopted in 1989 under the auspices of
the International Labour Organization, known as Convention (No.
169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries (the ILO Convention). 172 The ILO Convention requires
member states contemplating development activities to carry out
studies to assess the "social, spiritual, cultural and environmental
impact" on indigenous and traditional communities17 3 and to treat the
results as "fundamental criteria for the implementation of these
activities." 174
Subsequently, in 2004, the parties to the Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD) 17 5 adopted a set of guidelines to be used during EIAs
when actions may impact indigenous or traditional communities.1 7 6
Known as the Akw6:Kon Guidelines, they prescribe a cultural impact
assessment to identify and evaluate impacts on sacred sites,
traditional knowledge, and other features specific to indigenous and
traditional cultures.1 7 7 The Akw6:Kon Guidelines also call for a social
impact assessment to identify impacts that may arise in this context,
such as effects on traditional systems of production, social cohesion,
and relations between different genders and generations.1 78
EIAs are also addressed in non-binding declarations on the rights
of indigenous peoples adopted by the General Assemblies of the United

defined and "responsibilities for social impacts are often regarded rather loosely by both
mining enterprises and governments"); Naohiro Nakamura, Towards a Culturally
SustainableEnvironmental Impact Assessment: The Protectionof Ainu CulturalHeritage
in the Saru River CulturalImpact Assessment, Japan, 51 GEOGRAPHICAL RESEARCH 26,
28 (2013) (observing that conventional EIA procedures may not identify cultural impacts
because of "[a] gap ... in the understanding of the concept of 'cultural heritage' between
Indigenous and non-Indigenous members," and the fact that "Indigenous cultural
heritage often lacks physical material evidence").
172.
Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries, Geneva, June 27, 1989, 1650 U.N.T.S. 383 [hereinafter ILO
Convention].
173.
The ILO Convention uses the term "tribal peoples" to refer to peoples that
practice a traditional lifestyle or are otherwise socially, culturally and economically
distinct from the mainstream society, and are governed by special laws, customs or
traditions. See id. art. 1(a).
174.
Id. art. 7(3).
175.
CBD, supra note 153.
176.
Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Akw6: Kon Voluntary
Guidelines for the Conduct of Cultural, Environmental and Social Impact Assessment
regarding Developments Proposed to Take Place on, or which are Likely to Impact on,
Sacred Sites and on Lands and Waters Traditionally Occupied or Used by Indigenous
and Local Communities, 1 1 (2004) [hereinafter Akw6: Kon Guidelines].
Id. IT 21-34.
177.
178.
Id. IT 39-51.
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Nations (UNDRIP)' 79 and the Organization of American States
(ADRIP),18 0 in 2007 and 2016, respectively. These declarations not only
call for comprehensive EIAs in connection with development
projects, 18 1 but also articulate a number of rights specific to indigenous
peoples that any EIA would need to take into account. These rights
include, inter alia, the right to maintain, protect, and have access to
archaeological and other cultural sites;1 82 the right to enjoy their own
means of subsistence and other traditional economic activities,1 8 3 and
the right to conservation and protection of the local environment and
the productive capacity of their lands and resources. 184
The international community has also endorsed the second IDSeffective participation in decision making-in a number of contexts.
The Akw6:Kon Guidelines identify a number of steps to facilitate
participation by indigenous or traditional communities during EIAs,
including special forms of notification and communication to overcome
geographic or linguistic barriers. 8 5 In addition, several instruments
provide that states contemplating development projects must
affirmatively consult with the peoples concerned, in good faith, through
their own representative institutions.18 6 Some provide even that states
shall refrain from going forward under some circumstances unless the
consultations result in the peoples' free, prior and informed consent
(FPIC). Such an obligation to secure FPIC may exist, inter alia, where
a project would require a community's relocation,' 8 7 expose the
community to hazardous materials, 8 8 or involve access to traditional
knowledge or genetic resources.1 8 9
Finally, several international instruments contemplate some form
of benefit sharing: the third IDS. The ILO Convention provides in

179.
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples art. 25,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter UNDRIP].
Organization of American States, American Declaration on the Rights of
180.
(2016),
(XLVI-O/16)
2888
AG/RES.
Peoples,
Indigenous
http://www.narf.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/2016oas-declarationindigenous-people.pdf [https://perma.cc/J92C-94RE] (archived Oct 22, 2017) [hereinafter
ADRIP].
UNDRIP, supra note 179, art. 32; ADRIP, supra note 180, art. 29(5).
181.
182.
UNDRIP, supra note 179, arts. 11, 12; ADRIP, supra note 180, art. 16(3).
183.
UNDRIP, supra note 179, art. 20; ADRIP, supra note 180, art. 29(1).
184.
UNDRIP, supra note 179, art. 29; ADRIP, supra note 180, art. 19(4).
185.
Akw6: Kon Guidelines, supra note 176, T 10.
186.
See ILO Convention, supra note 172, arts. 6, 15; UNDRIP, supra note 179,
art. 32(2); ADRIP, supra note 180, art. 29(4); Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic
Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization
to the Convention
on Biological Diversity
art 6(3),
Oct.
29,
2010,
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/1 of 29 [hereinafter Nagoya Protocol].
187.
ILO Convention, supra note 172, art. 16; UNDRIP, supra note 179, art. 10.
188.
UNDRIP, supra note 179, art. 29(2).
189.
CBD, supranote 153, art. 15; Nagoya Protocol, supra note 186, arts. 6, 7.
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particular that if the state approves the exploitation of indigenous or
tribal peoples' resources, the peoples concerned "shall wherever
possible participate in the benefits of such activities, and shall receive
fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result
of such activities."19 0 UNDRIP and ADRIP similarly call for
compensation if a development project affects an indigenous people's
lands or resources 9 1 or their means of subsistence.1 92 In addition, a
supplementary agreement to the CBD adopted in 2010-known as the
Nagoya Protocol-requires benefit sharing as a condition for accessing
traditional knowledge and genetic resources.19 3
Apart from the adoption of these instruments, international
human rights bodies have found that adherence to the IDSs is vital for
states to uphold their more general human rights obligations. This
view is expressed, for example, in the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights' ruling in Saramaka People v. Suriname.194 In that case, a
traditional Maroon community, the Saramakas, contended that
Suriname violated their right to property under the American
Convention on Human Rights by authorizing mining, logging, and
other activities on their traditional lands without consent.19 5 The
Court upheld the Saramakas' claim, concluding that their right to
property included the right "to freely determine and enjoy their own
social, cultural and economic development, which includes the right to
enjoy their particular spiritual relationship with the territory they
have traditionally used and occupied."1 96 The Court held further that
Suriname could not restrict this right without complying with the
IDSs. 9 7 Indeed, the Court found that "effective participation" in this
context would have required Suriname to secure the Saramakas'
consent before authorizing the development activities, which Suriname
failed to do.' 9 8 In the Court's view, although consultations may be
sufficient in some contexts, a heightened standard-FPIC-is

190.
ILO Convention, supranote 172, art. 15.
191.
UNDRIP, supra note 179, art. 32; ADRIP, supra note 180, art. 29(5).
192.
UNDRIP, supra note 179, art. 20; ADRIP, supra note 180, art. 29(5).
193.
Nagoya Protocol, supranote 186, art. 5.
194.
Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., (ser. C) No. 172 (2007) [hereinafter
Saramaka Judgment].
195.
Id. ¶¶ 12, 95-96.
196.
Id. ¶ 95.
197.
Id. ¶ 146 ("[T]he State should not have granted logging concessions within
Saramaka territory unless and until the three safeguards of effective participation,
benefit-sharing, and prior environmental and social impact assessments were complied

with."); id. ¶¶ 147-48 (determining that Suriname failed to fulfill the IDSs).
198.
Id. TT 134-37.
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appropriate for large-scale projects that could affect the integrity of a
19 9
traditional people's lands and resources.
The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights has taken
2 00
the
a similar approach. For example, in SERAC v. Nigeria,
claimants contended that Nigeria violated rights of the traditional
Ogoni people under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
by authorizing oil companies to carry out operations on Ogoni lands
without conducting EIAs, consulting the Ogoni, or providing adequate
benefits. 201 Although the African Charter did not expressly articulate
the IDSs, the Commission found that Nigeria could not uphold certain
rights the African Charter did articulate-including rights to health,
to a satisfactory environment, and to freely dispose of wealth and
20 2
natural resources-without adhering to those safeguards.
2.

Domestic Legal Frameworks

As the IDSs have coalesced at the international level, many
countries have adopted parallel protections for indigenous and
traditional communities in their domestic legal frameworks.
a.

Developments in the United States

In the United States, each IDS has been incorporated to some
extent in federal law or policy in recent decades.
The EIA safeguard is reflected in part in a 1994 Executive
Order. 20 3 That Order directs federal agencies to "make achieving
environmental justice part of its mission" by identifying and
addressing "disproportionately high and adverse human health or
environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on
minority populations and low-income populations," including Native

Id.; see also Saramaka People v. Suriname, Interpretation of the Judgment
199.
on Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., (ser.
C) No. 185, 1 17 (2008) ("The Tribunal has emphasized that when large-scale
development or investment projects could affect the integrity of the Saramaka people's
lands and natural resources, the State has a duty not only to consult with the
Saramakas, but also to obtain their free, prior, and informed consent in accordance with

their customs and traditions.").
Social & Economic Rights Action Center & Another v. Nigeria, African
200.
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, (2001) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 2001), Comm.
No. 155/96 (May 27, 2002).
Id. ¶¶ 1-10, 55; see also Laura Westra, The Conflict Between Development
201.
and the Right of the Child to Health, 42 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 4 (2013) ("[T]he
Ogoni people had a comfortable traditional lifestyle, cultivating their land and fishing"
before adverse impacts of oil and gas development).
Social & Economic Rights Action Center & Another v. Nigeria, supra note
202.
200, ¶¶ 50-58.
Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1994).
203.
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American communities. 204 In addition, CEQ guidance identifies a
number of ways in which NEPA procedures should be tailored to
identify impacts on these communities. 205 Moreover, federal statutes
and regulations require consideration of impacts specific to Native
American communities in several contexts, including effects on the
subsistence needs of Alaska natives 2 0 6 and effects on traditional
cultural properties. 20 7
The effective participation safeguard is also developing in the
United States. CEQ guidance calls on agencies to take measures to
overcome linguistic, cultural, and other barriers to participation by
Native American communities in the NEPA process. 208 Further, an
Executive Order and a separate Presidential Memorandum direct
federal agencies to engage in "regular and meaningful consultation"
with tribal governments on matters that significantly affect their
communities. 209 Federal statutes and regulations identify several
specific contexts in which such consultations are required, including
when actions may affect native human remains or funerary objects,
properties of cultural significance, or the subsistence takes of Alaska
natives, or when actions will have environmental effects on a
reservation.2 1 0
While the federal government's "meaningful consultation" policy
has generated dialogue in many cases, it notably does not require

204.
Id.; see also U.S. Council on Envtl. Quality, Environmental Justice:
Guidance Under the National Environmental Policy Act 1 (Dec. 10, 1997),
https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/nepapub/nepa-documents/RedDont/G-CEQEJGuidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/S3QB-SQNS] (archived Oct. 23, 2017) [hereinafter
CEQ Environmental Justice Guidance] ("The Executive Order makes clear that its
provisions apply fully to programs involving Native Americans.").
205.
CEQ Environmental Justice Guidance, supra note 204, at 8.
206.
16 U.S.C. § 3120(a) (2012).
207.
Alex Tallchief Skibine, Towards a Balanced Approach for the Protection of
Native American Sacred Sites, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 269, 299-300 (2012) ("[F]ederal
agencies considering a federal 'undertaking' must first identify tribes with potentially
impacted TCPs [traditional cultural properties], consult with such affected Indian tribes,
and develop alternatives aimed at minimizing potential adverse effects on TCPs.").
208.
CEQ Environmental Justice Guidance, supra note 204, at 9.
209.
Robert J. Miller, Consultationor Consent: The United States'Duty to Confer
with American Indian Governments, 91 N.D. L. REV. 37, 56 (2015), (citing Exec. Order
No. 12,875, 58 Fed. Reg. 58,093 (1993)); see also Memorandum for the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies: Tribal Constitution, 74 Fed. Reg. 57,881 (Nov. 5, 2009).
210.
40 C.F.R. § 1503.1(a) (2017) (requiring federal agencies to consult with
Indian tribes during the EIS process "when the effects may be on a reservation"); Stuart
R. Butzier & Sarah M. Stevenson, Indigenous Peoples Rights to Sacred Sites and
Traditional Cultural Properties and the Role of Consultation and Free, Prior and
Informed Consent, 32 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 297, 314-16 (2014) (summarizing
consultation requirements under federal statutes); Greta Swanson, Kathryn Mengerink
& Jordan Diamond, Understanding the Government-to-Government Consultation
Framework for Agency Activities That Affect Marine Natural Resources in the U.S. Arctic,
43 ENVTL. L. REPORTER 10872, 10880-81 (2013) (summarizing the requirement to
consult with Alaska natives before regulating subsistence takes).
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agencies to secure Indian tribes' consent for development projects. 211
As a practical matter, tribes may be able to control whether or not
development activity takes place on lands over which they have
beneficial ownership. 212 Yet they lack such control when the activity
would take place off tribal lands, even if it could affect them.2 1 3 This
might be the case, for example, if an off-reservation project would harm
tribes' treaty rights to hunt or fish or would harm sites of cultural
significance. 214

Even though federal agencies are not bound to secure tribal
consent in such situations, agencies are sometimes influenced by input
from tribes. For example, the Obama administration repeatedly halted
construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline-intended to transport oil
from the Bakken Formation in Montana to an existing pipeline in
Illinois-following protests and lawsuits by local tribes. 215 Similarly,
the Army cited the opposition of the Lummi Nation as the reason for

211.
Miller, supranote 209, at 64 ('Tribal governments have been inun4ated with
consultation requests in recent decades. The presidential executive orders and
memoranda have created a cottage industry in tribal consultations."); id. ('The lack of a
consent requirement-actual consent by a tribe before federal agencies can proceed-is
one of the main sticking points.").
212.
FELIx S. COHEN, COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 17.03 (Nell
Jessup Newton ed., 2012) ("When lands are reserved or otherwise set aside for Indian
tribes, the tribes hold the beneficial ownership of both the soil and the mineral
interests."); id. § 17.04 ("Indian tribes have full beneficial ownership of timber located on
their reservations.").

See Akilah Jenga Kinnison, Note, Indigenous Consent: Rethinking U.S.
213.
Consultation Policies in Light of the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, 53 ARiZ. L. REV. 1301, 1305 (2011) ("Although indigenous peoples' consent is
required for extractive projects on lands to which they hold title, special conflicts arise
when such activities are conducted on their traditional lands that are now classified as
'public' and managed by the federal government.").
See, e.g., Emily Bregel, Tribe's Protest of Mine Plan Near Superioris in Third
214.
Week, ARiz. DAILY STAR (Feb. 20, 2015), http://tucson.com/news/state-and-regional/tribes-protest-of-mine-plan-near-superior-is-in/articlef55 1fab 1-853b-5826-90379ddb3739e5fe.html [https://perma.cc/AHL7-SX38 I (archived Oct. 23, 2017) (discussing
protests by tribal members against a proposed copper mine on federal land held sacred
to the tribe); Phuong Le, Major Battle Over Oil Terminal Unfolds in PacificNorthwest,
ASSOC. PRESS (June 25, 2016) (discussing concern that an oil-by-rail terminal along the
Columbia River could interfere with "treaty-reserved fishing rights and that a potential
oil spill could have devastating consequences to salmon and other natural resources on
which the tribe depends.").
215.
See Press Release, Joint Statement from Dep't of Justice, Dep't of the Army
& Dep't of the Interior Regarding Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opalpr/joint-statement-departmentjustice-department-army-and-department-interior-regarding-standing
[https://perma.cc/5JJE-RX8D] (archived Oct. 23, 2017) (calling for construction halt in
light of "important issues raised by the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and other tribal
nations and their members regarding the Dakota Access pipeline").
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its recent denial of a proposal to build a coal export terminal north of
Seattle. 216
The effective participation safeguard is also promoted by statutes
that authorize the Environmental Protection Agency to delegate
pollution control authority to Indian tribes. 2 17 When tribes qualify,
they can establish their own pollution control regulations, which can
exceed federal standards. 218 This is a particularly robust form of
participation, allowing tribes to act as decision makers rather than
merely providing input.
Finally, the benefit-sharing safeguard is fulfilled at least in part
through a variety of federal laws and policies. Although at one time
Indian tribes had little control over development activity on tribal
lands, federal statutes now authorize tribes to negotiate agreements
with private companies to develop tribal resources, subject to federal
agency approvals and controls. 2 19 Moreover, some tribes have treaty
rights to hunt or fish off-reservation, including commercial
harvesting. 2 20 Federal agencies have also authorized some Indian
tribes to commercially exploit forest resources on non-tribal federal
lands where these tribes have treaty rights. 2 21 In addition, a federal

&

216.
Johnson, supra note 15 ("mhe corps agreed [with the Lummi], saying that
the developer's plan to extend docks across 144 acres over the water could have restricted
access to the water by the tribe. That concern was enough to stop the terminal, corps
officials said, even without considering potential environmental harm.").
217.
Michael C. Blumm, Retracting the Discovery Doctrine: Aboriginal Title,
Tribal Sovereignty, and Their Significance to Treaty-Making and Modern Natural
Resources Policyin Indian Country, 28 VT. L. REV. 713, 770 (2004) ("All the major federal
environmental statutes, except the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),
enable the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to approve tribal programs to
function as states for the purpose of implementing pollution control programs.").
218.
Id. at 772.
219.
Maura Grogan, Rebecca Morse & April Youpee-Roll, NativeAmerican Lands
and Natural Resource Development, REV. WATCH INST.
13-16
(2011),
http://www.resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/RWINativeAmericanLands_20
11.pdf [https://perma.cc/QRJ6-E7R7] (archived Oct. 23, 2017) (summarizing the
development of Indian tribes' rights vis-A-vis mineral extraction); Colette Routel
Jeffrey Holth, Toward Genuine Tribal Consultation in the 21st Century, 46 U. MICH. J.
L. REFORM 417, 434 (2013) ("[T]ribes usually decide whether to lease their land, mineral,
and timber resources. . . . Yet federal law provides that these leases are void until
approved by the federal government in its role as trustee over tribal resources.").
220.
Blumm, supra note 217, at 765-66 (treaty fishing rights in the Pacific
Northwest and Great Lakes region have been found to "include implied water rights, the
right to harvest commercially, and the right to harvest hatchery as well as spawning
fish").
221.
See Brett Kenney, Tribes as ManagersofFederalNaturalResources, 27 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T. (2012) (discussing an agreement between the Confederated Tribes
of the Warm Springs and two federal agencies, which authorizes the tribes to harvest
biomass from federal forests for use in generating power for the tribe's forest products
company),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/damlaba/publications/natural resources environm
ent/summer20l2/nre-suml2-kenney.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LT2-8UGR]
(archived Nov. 19, 2017).
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statute directs the State of Alaska to share with Alaska natives
specified percentages of revenues derived from the exploitation of
mineral resources on federal lands in Alaska to which native claims
have been extinguished. 222
b.

Developments Around the World

Numerous other countries have similarly adopted protections for
indigenous or traditional communities in recent years.
In Canada, for example, the EIA safeguard has been incorporated
into the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, which requires
decision makers to consider "any change that the project may cause
in .

.

. the current use of lands and resources for traditional purposes

by Aboriginal persons."2 2 3 In addition, review panels must consider
traditional knowledge as part of an EIA. 224 In the same vein, the
National Energy Board has identified potential impacts on Aboriginal
groups that must be considered during ElAs for energy projects,
including effects on vegetation, water bodies, fish, or wildlife "of
specific concern to an Aboriginal group." 225
Canada has also taken a number of steps consistent with the
effective participation safeguard. Notably, the federal government has
negotiated land claims agreements (LCAs) with several Aboriginal
groups, which grant those groups land and governance rights over
defined territories. 226 LCAs require the government to consult with the
groups prior to authorizing any natural resource development and
establish bodies with Aboriginal representation for planning and
implementing development projects. 227
Further, the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that the
Crown has a duty to consult with Aboriginal groups that may be
adversely impacted by governmental actions even outside the context

222.
Dwight Newman, Michelle Biddulph & Loreell Binnion, Arctic Energy
Development and Best Practiceson Consultation with Indigenous Peoples, 32 B.U. INVL
L. J. 449, 457-58 (2014) (summarizing the statute's royalty payment framework).
223.
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, S.C. 1992, c. 37, s. 2(1).
Lynda M. Collins & Meghan Murtha, Indigenous Environmental Rights in
224.
Canada: The Right to Conservation Implicit in Treaty and Aboriginal Rights to Hunt,
Fish, and Trap, 47 ALBERTA L. REV. 959, 963 n.25 (2010) (summarizing the Canadian
federal government's efforts to enhance aboriginal participation in EIAs).
https://www.nebBoard,
Filing
Manual,
225.
National
Energy
[https://perma.cc/8PSG-QJPK]
one.gc.ca/bts/ctrg/gnnb/flngmn1/fmgda2-eng.html
(archived Oct. 23, 2017).
Newman, Biddulph & Binnion, supra note 222, at 464.
226.
See id. at 117-20 (summarizing LCAs negotiated with various indigenous
227.
groups in the Northwest Territories).

76

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 51:39

of LCAs.22 8 The nature of the consultation required follows a spectrum
that depends on the strength of the asserted rights and the seriousness
of the potential impact on those rights. 229 However, the Crown is under
no obligation to secure the consent of the impacted indigenous
communities before approving a development project.23 0 The Crown
may still approve a project if it has a "compelling and substantial"
public purpose and is "not inconsistent with the Crown's fiduciary
duties to the Aboriginal group."23 1
Nevertheless, if an Aboriginal group challenges the adequacy of
consultations it can result in delays or reputational harm to the
developer, which gives the developer an incentive to secure Aboriginal
consent before undertaking a project. 232
Canada has also implemented the benefit-sharing IDS to some
extent. Specifically, LCAs require some form of economic participation
by the impacted Aboriginal group when development projects are
carried out on lands subject to the LCA, with the details to be
negotiated. 2 33 Moreover, the duty to consult has encouraged benefit
sharing, as an affected Aboriginal group is less likely to challenge the
adequacy of consultations if the project proponent has offered a benefitsharing arrangement that the group considers acceptable. 234
Other countries have likewise adopted protections for indigenous
or traditional communities, either to implement the ILO Convention 2 35

228.
Laurin & Jamieson, supra note 170, at 456; Newman, Biddulph & Binnion,
supra note 222, at 116.
229.

DWIGHT G. NEWMAN,

REVISITING THE DUTY TO CONSULT ABORIGINAL

PEOPLES 17 (2014) (describing the spectrum analysis required by Canadian Supreme
Court jurisprudence).

230.
Laurin & Jamieson, supra note 170, at 459 ("Even in the case of serious
impact, the right to be consulted does not necessarily amount to a right to informed
consent or a 'veto' over what can be done on the land as the duty to consult does not
require reaching agreement.").
231.
Tsilhqot'in Nation v. British Columbia, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 256, 269 (Can.).
232.
See Laurin & Jamieson, supra note 170, at 458 (discussing the risks of
"delays, expense and possible reputational damage," which developers can manage by
entering into agreements with affected communities).
233.
See Newman, Biddulph & Binnion, supra note 222, at 116 ("[w]henever
resource extraction is contemplated on traditional indigenous Arctic lands, the affected
Indigenous groups may influence decision that will affect those lands.").
234.
What Are Impact and Benefit Agreements?, FRASIER INST.,
http://www.miningfacts.org/Communities/What-are-Impact-and-Benefit-Agreements(IBAs)/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2017) [http://perma.cc/CCZ5-VLKM] (archived Oct. 21, 2017)
[hereinafter FRASIER INSTITUTE].

235.
See Laura M. Seelau & Ryan Seelau, When I Want Your Opinion, I'll Give It
To You: How Governments Support the Indigenous Right to Consultationin Theory, But
Not in Practice, 23 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 547, 562-66 (2015) (describing Chile's
adoption of a consultation policy to implement the LO Convention); John P. Williams,
Global Trends and Tribulationsin Mining Regulation, 30 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES
L. 391, 417 (2012) (same regarding Peru).
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or on their own initiative.2 3 6 Again, however, these frameworks
generally stop short of requiring the state to secure affected
communities' consent before approving development activities. 237
One notable exception is a statute in the Philippines known as the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA). 2 38 Adopted in 1997, IPRA
requires FPIC from indigenous communities as a condition for various
actions, including the exploration, development, and use of natural
resources claimed by indigenous groups. 239 Nevertheless, several
indigenous communities have contended-following the adoption of
IPRA-that the central government has authorized projects on their
lands without FPIC. 240 In addition, indigenous rights advocates have
reported attempts to manipulate consultation processes, including
bribery of indigenous peoples' representatives, 241 and the appointment
of alternative representatives when consent was not forthcoming from
the traditional leaders. 24 2 Similar problems are sometimes reported
with the implementation of indigenous rights frameworks in other
countries. 243

&

236.
See Marcia Langton & Odette Mazel, Poverty in the Midst of Plenty:
Aboriginal People, the 'Resource Curse' and Australia's Mining Boom, 26 J. ENERGY
NAT. RESOURCES L. 31, 39-41 (2008) (describing Australia's adoption of a legislative
framework for recognizing Aboriginal land rights and requiring consultations, in order
to implement a decision of the Australian Supreme Court that recognized the concept of
"native title").
237.
See Butzier & Stevenson, supra note 210, at 317-19 (summarizing legal
frameworks regarding indigenous consultation in Peru, Bolivia, Mexico, Papua New
Guinea, the Philippines, Colombia, and Australia); Newman, Biddulph & Binnion, supra
note 222, at 124-32 (describing legal frameworks for indigenous consultation in Russia,
Greenland, and Norway); Seelau & Seelau, supra note 235, at 555-67 (outlining the
indigenous rights framework in Chile); Williams, supra note 235, at 417 (asserting that
Peruvian law requires consultation with indigenous peoples but "does not grant the
affected peoples a veto over local development").
238.
The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997, Rep. Act No. 8371 (1997) (Phil.).
239.
Id. §§ 7(c), 33(a), 35, 46(a), 58.
240.

See

RODOLFO

STAVENHAGEN,

PEASANTS,

CULTURE

AND

INDIGENOUS

'

PEOPLES 130 (2012) (asserting that the government went forward with a dam project
despite a refusal by an indigenous group to consent); Reda M. Hicks, Nereus 0. Acosta
& Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Crafting a Sustainable Mining Policy in the Philippines, 27
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T. 43, 44 (2013) (discussing lawsuits alleging a failure to secure
FPIC for mining projects).
241.
See George K Foster, Combating Bribery of Indigenous Leaders in
InternationalBusiness, 54 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 59, 71 (2015) (summarizing reports

of alleged bribery of indigenous leaders in the Philippines).
242.
See Joji Carifio, Indigenous Peoples'Right to Free, Prior, Informed Consent:
Reflections on Concepts and Practice, 22 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 19, 34-35 (2005)
(asserting that the "imposition or cultivation of rival leaderships is common," and citing
an example in which a mining company purported to negotiate an agreement with a nontraditional body).
243.
See, e.g., Butzier & Stevenson, supra note 210, at 330-31 (summarizing
court cases brought by indigenous groups in New Zealand, Chile, Belize, and Kenya
challenging violation of their legal rights); Seelau & Seelau, supra note 235, at 567-80
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As these examples demonstrate, indigenous and traditional
communities have secured formal recognition of important rights in
many countries, although those rights are limited in scope and not
always implemented effectively in practice.

III. EMERGING PRIVATE SOURCES OF COMMUNITY INFLUENCE AND
BENEFITS

In addition to formal legal protections for communities, private
mechanisms have emerged that can provide a further source of
influence and benefits. The subparts that follow examine two such
mechanisms: (i) financial institution standards and non-binding
guidelines applicable to the private sector, and (ii) agreements between
communities and project developers.
A.

FinancialInstitution Standardsand Non-Binding Guidelines

In recent years, a number of intergovernmental organizations,
private institutions, and industry bodies have adopted policies or
guidelines that require or encourage project developers to comply with
environmental and social standards, many of which are designed to
protect the interests of local communities. 244 These policies and
guidelines are "private" in the sense that they apply to the private
sector, are not formalized in any law or regulation, and are enforceable
only when incorporated into private agreements. 245
Many financial institutions, for example, have adopted policies
that condition any financing on the borrower's adherence to specified
environmental and social standards. 246 Prominent examples are the

(describing a lawsuit brought by the Atacameno indigenous people of Chile contending
that the government failed to consult with the Atacameno before granting geothermal
concessions on their ancestral territory).
244.
Elisa Morgera, From Corporate Social Responsibility to Accountability
Mechanisms, in HARNESSING FOREIGN INVESTMENT TO PROMOTE ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION INCENTIVES AND SAFEGUARDS 321, 325 (Pierre-Marie Depuy & Jorge E.
Vifiuales eds., 2013) (summarizing standards and guidelines and concluding that they
generally call for "the ongoing assessment, beyond legal requirements at the national
level, of the possible environmental impacts of private companies' activities before and
during their operations, on the basis of scientific evidence, as well as communication
with likely-to-be-affected communities").
245.
See Elisa Morgera, Significant Trends in Corporate Environmental
Accountability: The New Performance Standards of the International Finance
Corporation, 18 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 151, 183 (2007) (explaining how
environmental and social standards can become binding when incorporated into
contracts).
246.
See Natasha Affolder, The Market for Treaties, 11 CHI. J. INT'L L. 159, 189
(2010) (discussing the nature of financial institution standards).

COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT

2018]

79

IFC Performance Standards 247 and the Equator Principles, the latter
being a version of the former adopted by many private financial
institutions. 248

The IFC Performance Standards and the Equator Principles both
require borrowers to take specified steps to evaluate potential
environmental and social risks before commencing a project and to
consult with local stakeholders likely to be impacted. 249 Although
neither require benefit sharing with all affected communities, they
may facilitate it by promoting dialogue and strengthening
communities' bargaining power. 250
Both sets of standards have special rules for projects that may
impact indigenous or traditional communities. Notably, whereas these
standards require only "informed consultation"251 for projects
impacting mainstream communities, they require "free, prior and
informed consent" for those impacting indigenous or traditional
groups. 252 The IFC Performance Standards add that indigenous or
traditional communities must receive compensation for any impacts,
which must be culturally appropriate, sustainable, and commensurate
with the nature and scale of the impacts. 253
Finally, these standards establish remedial frameworks for
concerned individuals, groups, or communities to challenge any
perceived non-compliance, without reliance on judicial systems. 254

247.
SOCIAL

INT'L FIN. CORP., PERFORMANCE STANDARDS ON ENVIRONMENTAL AND
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/
1,
2012),
(Jan.
SUSTAINABILITY

115482804a0255db96fbffdla5d13d27/PSEnglish_2012_Full-Document.pdf9MOD=
AJPERES (last visited Oct. 21, 2017) [https://perma.cclU7YC-3NAP] (archived Oct. 21,
2017) [hereinafter IFC Performance Standards].
248.

EQUATOR

PRINCIPLES

(June

2013),

http://www.equator-principles.com/

resources/equator.principlesIll.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2017) [https://perma.cc/9G445LPM] (archived Oct. 21, 2017) [hereinafter Equator Principles]; see also Affolder, supra
note 246, at 189 (describing the Equator Principles).
See Morgera, supra note 245, at 160-63 (describing the IFC Performance
249.
Standards); Equator Principles, supra note 248, at 6-8.
See IFC Performance Standards, supra note 247, Performance Standard 1,
250.
¶ 31 (requiring the borrower to discuss the possibility of benefit-sharing with affected
communities and record the communities' views on the subject).
Id. (emphasis added); Equator Principles, supra note 248, at 7.
251.
IFC Performance Standards, supranote 247, Performance Standard 7, ¶ 11
252.
(requiring FPIC if the project will have adverse effects on indigenous peoples' lands or
natural resources, will require their relocation, or will have significant project impacts
on critical cultural heritage); Equator Principles, supra note 248, at 7-8 (incorporating
the IFC Performance Standard's FPIC requirement).
IFC Performance Standards, supra note 247, Performance Standard 7, T 9.
253.
See Morgera, supra note 245, at 165-66 (describing the IFC's grievance
254.
mechanism); Equator Principles, supra note 248, at 8 (describing required grievance
mechanism).
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While these standards may not always offer sufficient
protection, 255 it is widely acknowledged that they have gen6rally
improved the assessment and management of environmental and
social risks in projects to which they apply and have helped address
community concerns in a number of cases. 256
Apart from these initiatives by financial institutions, several
international organizations and industry groups have promulgated
voluntary guidelines that encourage companies to employ similar
environmental and social standards.
An example is the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises, adopted by the member states of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development. 257 The OECD Guidelines call
on enterprises to assess the environmental, health, and safety impacts
of their activities, create targets for improved environmental
performance, and engage in regular monitoring and verification. 25 8
They also encourage enterprises to "[e]ngage with relevant
stakeholders in order to provide meaningful opportunities for their
views to be taken into account in relation to planning and decision
making for projects or other activities that may significantly impact
local communities."2 59 Finally, the OECD Guidelines encourage
enterprises to promote economic participation by local stakeholders,
calling for "active co-operation with stakeholders in creating wealth,
jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound enterprises." 260

&

255.
See, e.g., Shalanda H. Baker, Why the IFC's Free, Prior, and Informed
Consent Policy Does Not Matter (Yet) to Indigenous Communities Affected by
Development Projects, 30 WIS. INT'L L. J. 668, 675 (2012) (asserting that the Equator
Principles are "fairly vague, "and "it is unclear whether a project's deviation from the
principles would invite any real penalty"); Evaristus Oshionebo, World Bank and
SustainableDevelopment of Natural Resources in Developing Countries, 27 J. ENERGY
NAT. RESOURCES L. 193, 203 (2009) (asserting that project developers sometimes violate
financial institution standards without consequence).
256.
See, e.g., Daniel D. Bradlow, Private Complainants and International
Organizations: A Comparative Study of the Independent Inspection Mechanisms in
InternationalFinancialInstitutions, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 403, 410 (2005) (asserting that
financial institution remedial frameworks "have turned out to be effective forums in
which adversely affected persons can raise claims that relate to their rights as
indigenous people or as involuntarily resettled people"); Laurin & Jamieson, supra note
170, at 467-68 (observing that the Equator Principles "have greatly increased the
attention and focus on environmental, social, and governance issues, including setting

standards for relations with locally affected indigenous communities."); Schwartz, supra
note 98, at 444 (describing a project in Sierra Leone for which remedial action by a
financial institution "triggered official attention and consideration of concerns of the
local community which until then had largely been ignored").
257.
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (OECD), OECD GUIDELINES FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2011), http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf

(last visited Oct. 21, 2017) [https://perma.cc/52HE-EH7W ] (archived Oct. 21, 2017)
[hereinafter OECD Guidelines].
258.
Id. at 42.
259.
Id. at 20.
260.
Id. at 22.
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Another set of voluntary guidelines is the United Nations Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights (the UN Guiding
Principles), adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2011.261 The UN
Guiding Principles assert that businesses have an obligation to respect
the human rights of individuals and groups, which is independent of
state obligations or domestic legal requirements. 262 They also call on
businesses to carry out "human rights due diligence" to uphold that
obligation, and suggest that such due diligence should include an
assessment of the environmental and social impacts of the business's
operations, as well as stakeholder engagement. 263
International organizations and industry groups have also
adopted guidelines for particular sectors, such as mining 264 and
forestry. 265 These similarly call for EIAs, stakeholder consultation,
and-in some cases-benefit sharing, but they are tailored for the
circumstances of the relevant sector. 266
While all of these various guidelines are non-binding, developers
may feel some pressure to comply with them, lest they appear out of
step with international norms and incur reputational damage. 26 7
Moreover, developers that fail to assess and manage impacts, engage
with communities, and share benefits are more likely to encounter

261.
John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue
of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises),
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations
"Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011)
[hereinafter UN Guiding Principles].
262.
Id. at 13.
263.
Id. at 17-18.
264.

IN'L

COUNCIL

ON

MINING

&

METALS

(ICCM),

ICCM

PRINCIPLES,

https://www.icmm.com/en-gb/about-us/member-commitments/icmm-10-principles/theprinciples [https://perma.cc/3SQM-P9WG] (archived Oct. 21, 2017).
265.
INT'L. TROPICAL TIMBER ORG., VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES FOR THE
SUSTAINABLE MGMT. OF NAT. TROPICAL FORESTS, http://www.itto.int/partner/id=4330

[https://perma.cc/E58K-BTSZ] (archived Oct. 21, 2017).
See, e.g., id. at 51-55 (providing detailed recommendations for the prior
266.
assessment, mitigation, and ongoing monitoring of environmental impacts of timber
harvesting and related activities); id. at 56 ("Forest management decisions should be
participatory and inclusive, and the costs and benefits should be shared equitably among
stakeholders."); id. at 22, 26, 32, 36, 54-64 (outlining protocols for promoting stakeholder
participation in forestry management and benefit-sharing).
267.
See Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Kath Hall, Lawyers in the Shadow of the
Regulatory State: Transnational Governance on Business and Human Rights, 84

FORDHAM L. REV. 2001, 2007 (2016) ("Compliance with voluntary standards is often
monitored by NGOs, consumer groups, and investment consultants who may then
criticize a company for noncompliance. This can serve as a form of informal enforcement,
with serious financial and reputational consequences. . . . "); David B. Spence, Corporate
Social Responsibility in the Shale Patch?, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 387, 389 (2017)
(attributing oil companies' voluntary corporate social responsibility initiatives to "some
combination of short term self-interest, concerns over long-term reputational risk for the
firm, and the desire to be a good corporate citizen").
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community opposition, which can delay projects or jeopardize them
altogether.2 6 8
B.

Community Development Agreements

Another private innovation is the "community development
agreement" (CDA)-a type of agreement negotiated between a project
developer and the local government or community groups. 269 CDAs
take many forms and have many different names, but they generally
provide for the developer to provide specified benefits to the
community, or mitigate project impacts, in exchange for community
support. 270
One such contractual device that has become common in the
United States is known as a "development agreement." Under such an
agreement, the developer agrees to exactions sought by the local
government and waives its right to challenge them, in exchange for a
commitment by the local government to approve the project and refrain
from adopting any new land-use restrictions during the term of the
agreement.27 1 Local governments have used development agreements
to secure a wide range of community benefits that likely would have
failed the Nollan-Dolan test, because the benefits were unrelated or
disproportionate to project impacts. 272 Such benefits can include, for
example, monetary payments in excess of the cost of public services

268.
See Luke Danielson, Allocation of Resources to Communities From Mining
and Oil and Gas Operations, ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 2C-1, at 5 (2009) (asserting that
a failure to abide by minimum international standards frequently provokes community
resistance, and citing examples of projects in Argentina, Peru, Colorado, Romania, and
Guatemala that "have been delayed, sometimes for years, or stopped entirely by local
opposition").
269.
See Mining Community Development Agreements Source Book, WORLD BANK
5 (March 2012), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOGMC/Resources/mining
community.pdf [https://perma.cclDNF2-53RS] (archived Oct. 23, 2017) (defining CDA
and listing alternative names for these agreements); see also Jennifer Loutit, Jacqueline
Mandelbaum & Sam Szoke-Burke, Emerging Practices in Community Development
Agreements, COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT (Feb. 2016),

http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2016/02/Emerging-practices-in-CDAs-Feb-2016-sml.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K2M8-LHZQ] (archived Oct. 23, 2016) (describing several different
types of agreements as forms of CDAs).
270.
See Ciaran O'Faircheallaigh, Community Development Agreements in the
Mining Industry: An Emerging Global Phenomenon, 44 COMMUNITY DEV. 222, 222-23
(2013) (describing "an explosion in the negotiation of agreements between commercial
developers and local communities throughout the globe" and providing examples).
271.
Daniel P. Selmi, The Contract Transformation in Land Use Regulation, 63
STAN. L. REV. 591, 597 (2011) ("In these contracts, developers agree to provide negotiated
benefits to a municipality, such as increased infrastructure, that the city often could not
require under its regulatory authority. In return, the city agrees to allow a specific
development and to 'vest' the developer's right to build against any future land use
changes.").
272.
Id. at 610 (observing that "local government's attraction to contract stems
largely from a reaction to the Supreme Court's decisions in Nollan and Dolan").
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required by the development, infrastructure improvements not
necessary to address project impacts, and job training programs.27 3
Some local governments in the United States have also negotiated
agreements with developers that establish technical requirements that
these governments could not impose unilaterally because of state law
preemption. For example, at least thirty municipalities in Colorado
have negotiated "operator agreements" with oil companies that place
restrictions on fracking that go above and beyond state
requirements. 274 These municipalities decided to negotiate these
agreements-rather than banning fracking or establishing the
requirements by ordinance-because Colorado law preempts local
governments from imposing such restrictions.27 r The oil companies, in
turn, agreed to sign because the local governments agreed to expedite

the land-use approvals over which they did have authority. 276 The
companies likely also calculated that the agreements would facilitate
better relations with the communities more generally.
Another type of agreement that has become common in the United
States is known as a "community benefit agreement" (CBA). Under a

.

&

Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative
273.
Model for FosteringEquality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land
Use Decisions, Installment One, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 3, 31-32 (2005) (providing
examples of benefits negotiated by municipalities that likely would have violated the
Nollan-Dolan test if the developer had not consented).
274.
See, e.g., Peter Marcus, ColoradoLegislature Kills FrackingBill that Would
04,
2016),
(Apr.
HERALD
DURANGO
Control,
Local
Given
Have
http://www.durangoherald.com/article/20160404/NEWS01/160409877/Colorado[https://perma.cc/
Legislature-kills-fracking-bill-that-would-have-given-local-control
9ZJ7-GJFW ] (archived Oct. 23, 2017) ("More than 30 communities across Colorado
already have entered into private contracts with oil and gas companies that allow those
communities to invoke rules that go above and beyond" state requirements); Cathy
Proctor, Encana, Erie Reach GroundbreakingAgreement on Oil and Gas Operations,
https://www.bizjournals.com/denver/
26,
2015),
J.
(Aug.
DENVER
BUS.
blog/earthtopower/2015/08/encana-erie-reach-groundbreaking-agreement-on-oil.html
[https://perma.ce/RR55-G7X8] (archived Oct. 23, 2017) (describing agreement between
the town of Erie and the Encana Corporation).
Minor, supra note 49, at 99, 102 (describing technical conditions that courts
275.
have held preempted, including setback requirements, noise abatement, and visual
impact provisions); Tayvis Dunnahoe, Colorado Communities Collaborate with
Operators, OIL & GAS J. (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.ogj.com/articles/uogr/print/volume1/issue-4/colorado-communities-collaborate-with-operators.html [https://perma.cc/7CJ5HFL8] (archived Oct. 23, 2017) (asserting that Erie opted to negotiate an agreement with
Encana in part because "[i]n Colorado, oil and gas development is considered a statewide
concern" and hence local regulation is preempted).
276.
See, e.g., Operator Agreement Between the Town of Erie and Encana Oil
Gas (USA), Inc., art. IV(1)(b)(i) ("This Agreement shall constitute final approval by Erie
of the Identified Pad Sites, all wells, facilities, and operations located at such Pad Sites,
all adjacent tanks used for such Pad Sites, and all storage facilities for such Pad Sites .
. . "); see also Proctor, supra note 274 (quoting statements by Erie and Encana
representatives describing their rationales for signing the agreement).
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CBA, the developer offers a package of benefits to community groups
likely to be impacted by the project, in exchange for a commitment by
community signatories to support it.2 7 7 CBAs are sometimes criticized
as a product of insufficient public participation, because they are
negotiated in private and the groups involved may not reflect the
community as a whole.27 8 Nevertheless, CBAs can provide groups that
participate with a significant voice in how projects are carried out, in
addition to whatever community benefits the agreement secures.2 79
Another contractual device that is becoming popular in the United
States is the "good neighbor agreement" (GNA). 2 80 Like CBAs, GNAs
are negotiated directly between project developers and community
groups but focus on mitigating the impacts of industrial activities. 28 i
For example, a GNA may require the developer to meet specified
emissions standards, make disclosures to the public, and establish a
monitoring role for community groups. 282 The developer typically offers
any such measures in exchange for an agreement by the community
signatories to drop citizen suits or other forms of opposition.2 8 3 Some
have criticized GNAs because they can allow companies to avoid the
full cost of any environmental violations, including public relations
damage and monetary penalties that might be imposed following a
successful citizen suit. 284 Critics have also asserted that GNAs reduce
the pressure that might otherwise exist to improve state and federal

277.
See Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, Community Benefits Agreements and
Comprehensive Planning:Balancing Community Empowerment and the Police Power, 18
J. L. & POL'Y 157, 159, 177 (2009) (describing CBAs).
278.
See Alejandro E. Camacho, Community Benefit Agreements: A Symptom, Not
the Antidote, of Bilateral Land Use Regulation, 78 BROOKLYN L. REV. 355, 370 (2013)
(explaining that critics of CBAs have questioned "whether the full range of interests are
represented in negotiations" and "whether a representative of a particular interest group

is truly representative, including whether they have properly managed diverse points of
view").
279.
Id. at 364-65 ("CBAs grant communities, including low-income and minority
groups, a voice in the development process, empowering them with a degree of control
where corporate interests usually dominate. As such, CBAs offer community groups the
opportunity for procedural justice by enabling them to participate directly in decision
making.").
280.
Douglas S. Kenney et al., Evaluating the Use of Good NeighborAgreements
for Environmental and Community Protection, NATURAL RES. L. CTR., UNIV. OF COLO.

SCH.
OF
L.
(2004),
http://scholar.law.colorado.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=
1018&context=booksreports studies [https://perma.cc/GT8Q-G7XZ] (archived Oct. 23,
2017) (describing the rise of the GNA and disputes resolved through these agreements).
281.
See Salkin & Lavine, supra note 277, at 182 (comparing CBAs and GNAs).
282.
See id. at 182-83 (describing common terms of GNAs); Janet V. Siegel,
Negotiating for Environmental Justice: Turning Polluters into "Good Neighbors"
Through CollaborativeBargaining,10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 147, 171-72 (2002) (same).
283.
See Kenney et al., supra note 280, at 1 (describing concessions typically
offered by developers in GNAs and noting that these are offered "in exchange for a
community commitment to stop litigation, a permit challenge, or some other form of
activism against the company").
284.
Siegel, supra note 282, at 180-81 (identifying drawbacks to GNAs).
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enforcement regimes. 285 Yet it is not difficult to see the appeal of GNAs.
These agreements can allow community groups to secure immediate
redress without the cost and uncertainty of litigation, and without
having to wait for hypothetical future regulatory reform. GNAs can
2 86
also secure innovative remedies that could not be ordered by a court.
Various types of CDAs are becoming popular in other countries as
well.2 8 7 Outside the United States, such agreements are known by a
multitude of names, including impact benefit agreement, 2 88 indigenous
land use agreement,2 8 9 and social responsibility agreement,29 0 to name
a few.
Like GNAs in the United States, CDAs negotiated in other
countries often give the community a role in monitoring and managing
environmental impacts. The agreement may, for example, establish a
committee with community representation to monitor project
impacts, 2 9 ' provide funding for the community to hire independent
technical experts, or even train community members as environmental
technicians.2 92 Such agreements also often provide some form of
community benefits, which may include monetary payments that are
fixed in amount or tied to production or profits. 293 It is also common for
CDAs around the world to include commitments by the developer to
build local hospitals, schools, or other infrastructure. 294 The

See Thalia GonzAlez & Giovanni Saarman, Regulating Pollutants, Negative
285.
Externalities, and Good Neighbor Agreements: Who Bears the Burden of Protecting
Communities?, 41 ECOLOGY L. Q. 37, 77 (2014) ("GNAs can promote community policing
and private monitoring efforts, but they fail to incentivize comprehensive regulatory
monitoring.").

286.
See Kenney et al., supra note 280, at 8 (noting that GNAs "often employ[]
creative remedies not usually available through regulatory or litigation mechanisms").
287.
See O'Faircheallaigh, supranote 270, at 225 (asserting that such agreements
are regularly negotiated in Australia, Canada, Africa, South America, Central Asia,
South East Asia, and the former Soviet Union).
288.
See Laurin & Jamieson, supra note 170, at 458 (describing Canadian IBAs).
See Butzier & Stevenson, supra note 210, at 318; Langton & Mazel, supra
289.
note 236, at 41 (describing indigenous land use agreements in Australia).
290.
See, e.g., AHAFO Soc. RESPONSIBILITY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE AHAFO
MINE LOCAL CMTY. AND NEWMONT GOLD GHANA LTD., http://www.sdsg.org/wp-

content/uploads/2011/06/Ahafo-Social-Responsibility-Agreement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L4ZH-7BV9] (archived Oct. 23, 2017).
291.
Gibson & O'Faircheallaigh, supra note 18, at 169-70; Loutit, Mandelbaum
& Szoke-Burke, supra note 269, at 11-12.
292.
Gibson & O'Faircheallaigh, supra note 18, at 170; O'Faircheallaigh, supra
note 270, at 228 (describing a 2008 CDA for the Goro nickel project in New Caledonia,
which provides for community members "to be involved in the design of environmental
management programs; have access to specialist environmental advice; establish
businesses to undertake mine rehabilitation; and [be trained] as environmental
technicians").
293.
Gibson & O'Faircheallaigh, supra note 18, at 141-42; Loutit, Mandelbaum
& Szoke-Burke, supra note 269, at 9.
294.
Loutit, Mandelbaum & Szoke-Burke, supra note 269, at 9-10.
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community may even secure an equity stake in the project, which can
bring increased profit potential and allow the community to acquire
valuable commercial expertise, but also exposes the community to
greater financial risk. 29 5 CDAs also often provide hiring preferences for
community members or locally owned businesses, sometimes featuring
training programs to increase community members' employability. 296
Optimally, whatever benefits are secured will be sustainable-not
simply providing a temporary infusion of cash, but building local
capacity and positioning the community to thrive even after the project
ends.
In many cases, developers are under no legal obligation to
conclude CDAs and do so simply to avoid conflict with the community,
or because having an agreement will make it easier to obtain required
approvals. 29 7 In recent years, however, a number of countries have
adopted laws or regulations making it mandatory for developers to
enter into CDAs for particular types of projects: 298 a trend encouraged
intergovernmental
donors
and
regional
by
international
organizations. 29 9 One factor that may make such CDA mandates
appealing (or at least palatable) to central governments is that these
mandates task the developer-rather than the government-with
satisfying demands of local communities. Moreover, CDAs pose no
threat to central governments' control over permitting processes or
their own shares of project revenues.

IV.

EXPLAINING THE GLOBAL WAVE OF COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

Parts II and III explored different facets of the global wave of
community participation in development: the rise of community rights
and powers formalized in domestic or international law, and the
parallel emergence of private sources of community leverage. The
present Part IV will offer a model for explaining these developments.

295.
Gibson & O'Faircheallaigh, supra note 18, at 143.
296.
O'Faircheallaigh, supra note 270, at 230.
297.
See Laurin & Jamieson, supra note 170, at 458 (noting significant risk of
delay or invalidation in absence of a CDA); O'Faircheallaigh, supra note 270, at 227
(noting pitfalls where CDAs not negotiated); FRASIER INSTITUTE, supra note 234 (CDAs
may help avoid delays).
298.,

See Kendra E. Dupuy, Community Development Requirements in Mining

Laws, 1 EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES & Soc'Y 200, 200-02 (2014) (describing the spread of
CDA mandates and noting that mine developers are required to enter into CDAs in
Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Guinea, Mali, South Sudan, Afghanistan, and Yemen); Ibironke
T. Odumosu-Ayanu, Foreign Direct Investment Catalysts in West Africa: Interactions

with Local Content Laws and Industry-Community Agreements, 35 N.C. CENT. L. REV.
65, 83-84 (2012) (summarizing CDA legislation in Nigeria).
299.
See Dupuy, supra note 298, at 204-05 (discussing the influence of
international donors and regional inter-governmental organizations on the adoption of
CDA mandates).
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The first part of this model-outlined in Part IV.A-explains the
origin of the various community rights and powers. Specifically, each
arose in response to pressure from local interests and their supporters,
who perceived higher authorities as insufficiently representative,
lacking key information, or otherwise failing to protect local interests
or the environment. Reform advocates pressed for change to address
these concerns, and each new category of community rights and powers
was the response.
The second part of the model, outlined in Part IV.B, identifies and
accounts for recurring limitations in each category of community rights
and powers. Specifically, while higher authorities have made a number
of concessions in response to reform pressures, they have carefully
tailored each category of community rights and powers to avoid
outright local control over development. Higher authorities have had
diverse reasons for resisting local control, including the protection of
their own interests and those of powerful constituents, as well as
concerns about limited local capacity and risks to minority groups and
the broader public interest.
The third part of the model explains the place of private
mechanisms. Part IV.C will demonstrate in particular that the private
mechanisms described in Part III are designed to compensate for
remaining weaknesses in domestic and international legal
frameworks, and to provide-on a transaction-specific basis-at least
some of what communities have failed to achieve in the political arena.
Private mechanisms have a number of advantages that can make them
effective at balancing competing interests and producing further gains
for communities. At the same time, however, these mechanisms have
significant limitations of their own and communities should approach
them with caution.
A. Deficiencies of HigherAuthorities and Demands for Reform
The various rights and powers secured by communities in recent
decades have all developed in response to a recurring set of pressures
from local communities and their supporters, who perceived-and
sought to address-specific deficiencies in higher-level decision
making. In each case, reform advocates saw higher authorities as
failing to protect local communities and the environment from adverse
impacts of development, because these authorities were not sufficiently
representative of, or lacked sufficient input from, those affected by
their decisions.
As described in Part II.A.1, local governments in the United Sates
have increasingly sought to regulate fracking and other extractive
activities because of pressure from their citizens concerned about
impacts not adequately addressed by state and federal law. Similarly,
as explained in Part II.B, the driving force behind the global trend
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toward decentralization has been a common view among international
organizations, theorists, and local communities that higher authorities
are too far removed from those affected by their decisions-or are not
sufficiently representative of them.
In the same vein, a key motivation for adopting EIA and public
participation regimes has been the belief that responsible agencies
historically have not adequately considered impacts on affected
communities or the environment. Notably, in adopting NEPA and its
implementing regulations, Congress and the CEQ were responding to
pressure from the public to improve agency decision making and make
agencies more sensitive to threats posed by development to the
environment and stakeholders.30 0 A related rationale is that agency
decisions are more likely to be perceived as legitimate if affected
communities have participated in the decision-making process.3oi
Similarly, the rationale for the advent of the citizen suit is that higher
authorities do not always have sufficient resources or motivation to
enforce environmental laws. 302

Finally, the IDSs described in Part II.C developed in response to
a pattern of state authorities approving development activities with
harmful-and potentially devastating-impacts on indigenous and
traditional communities.3 0 3 Commentators have cited a number of

&

300.
See S. REP. No. 91-296, at 4 (1969) (asserting that the bill that became NEPA
was necessary because "our existing governmental institutions are not adequate to deal
with the growing environmental problems and crises the nation faces"); Lorna
Jorgensen, Note, The Move Toward Participatory Democracy in Public Land
Management Under NEPA: Is it Being Thwarted by the ESA?, 20 J. LAND RESOURCES
ENVTL. L. 311, 314 (2000) (observing that the federal government adopted NEPA and its
implementing regulations because "[t]he public was demanding more recognition of
environmental values and an opportunity to participate in decisions regarding those
values").

301.
Dietz & Stern, supranote 117, at 10 ("Broader and more direct participation
of the public and interested or affected groups in official environmental policy processes
has been widely advocated as a way to increase both the legitimacy and the substantive
quality of policy decisions."); Ebbesson, supranote 155, at 290 ("[P]ublic participation in
decision-making serves to legitimize environmental decisions, which engage a mix of
private and public interests.").
302.
See Conservation Law Found. v. Browner, 840 F. Supp. 171, 174 (D. Mass.
1993) (discussing rationale for the Clean Air Act's private right of action); Karl S. Coplan,
Citizen Litigants Citizen Regulators: Four Cases Where Citizen Suits Drove Development

of Clean Water Law, 25 COLO. NAT. RESOURCES ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 61, 65 (2014)
("Proponents of the citizen enforcement suit initially pointed to lax environmental
enforcement by government agencies to justify inclusion of a citizen suit in the landmark

air legislation, but later shifted their rationale to point to the efficiencies of
supplementing limited government enforcement resources.").
303.
See Saramaka Judgment, supra note 195, ¶ 85 ("[Mlembers of indigenous
and tribal communities require special measures that guarantee the full exercise of their
rights . . . in order to safeguard their physical and cultural survival."); Nic Maclellan,
Indigenous Peoples in the Pacific and the World Conference Against Racism, in RACISM
AGAINST INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 90, 108 (Suhas Chakma & Marianne Jensen eds., 2001)
(describing natural resource extraction projects in the Asia-Pacific region that have had
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factors that can undermine the quality and fairness of state decision
making when the interests of indigenous or traditional communities
are at stake. State authorities may be dominated by majority groups
that stand to benefit from the development activities in question, but
will not experience the negative externalities.3 0 4 Decision makers may
even be prejudiced against their society's indigenous or traditional
communities, leading them to tolerate impacts that they would not
accept in other contexts, or to discriminate against indigenous or
traditional groups when distributing compensation for project
impacts. 305 Or authorities may simply not understand the significance
to an indigenous or traditional community of particular lands,
resources, or cultural sites, or the community's perception of
impacts. 30 6

"major environmental consequences that have devastated local ecosystems, economies,
and cultural practices"); Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples' Rights Over Their Ancestral Lands and Natural Resources: Norms and
Jurisprudenceof the Inter-American Human Rights System, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 263,

400 (2010-2011) ("Infrastructure or development mega-projects, such as roads, canals,
dams, ports or the like, as well as concessions for the exploration or exploitation of
natural resources in ancestral territories, may affect indigenous populations with
particularly serious consequences . . . .").
304.
See, e.g., Bibobra Bello Orubebe, Environmental ImpactAssessment Law and
Land Use: A Comparative Analysis of Recent Trends in the Nigerian and U.S. Oil and
Gas Industry, in LAND USE LAW FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 281, 290 (Nathalie J.

Chalifour et al. eds., 2007) (attributing environmentally-destructive oil and gas
development in the Niger Delta to the fact that the state is dominated by majority ethnic
groups, while "the oil and gas resources are extracted from lands occupied by indigenous
minority tribes who have inadequate or no representation in the Federal Government of

Nigeria").
305.

See, e.g., Suhas Chakma, Behind the Bamboo Curtain: Racism in Asia, in

RACISMAGAINST INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 176, 188-93 (Suhas Chakma & Marianne Jensen

eds., 2001) (alleging that the Malaysian government has discriminated against
indigenous landowners in favor of ethnic Malays when designating land for highway
construction, approving dam and logging projects, and distributing compensation or
benefits); Maclellan, supra note 303, at 108 (asserting that some governments in the
Pacific have displayed "environmental racism" by targeting the lands and waters of
indigenous communities for dumping toxic or radioactive wastes, which these
governments would not allow in other locations); Mililani B. Trask, Afterword:
Implementing the Declaration, in INDIGENOUS

RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF THE UN

DECLARATION 327, 327 (Elvira Pulitano ed., 2012) (asserting that indigenous advocates
drafted UNDRIP to address "a legacy of racism and discrimination, exclusion,
xenophobia, marginalization, and forced assimilation").
306.
CARLY A. DOKIS, WHERE THE RIVERS MEET: PIPELINES, PARTICIPATORY
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, AND ABORIGINAL-STATE RELATIONS IN THE NORTHWEST

TERRITORIES 77-80 (2015) (discussing a disconnect between how impacts are viewed in
state EIA processes-namely, as something to be quantified and addressed with
technical solutions-and by aboriginal communities, which may view impacts as a
breakdown in the community's moral and physical relationships with animals and the
land); Frank Vanclay, Conceptual and Methodological Advances in Social Impact
Assessment, in THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT:
CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ADVANCES 1, 1 (Henk A. Becker & Frank Vanclay
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The IDSs are designed to counteract any such factors that might
affect state decision making in particular cases. As explained in Part
II.C, the IDSs require state authorities to take particular steps to
identify the full range of potential impacts specific to indigenous and
traditional communities, consult with and potentially even defer to
affected communities, and offer appropriate compensation when
impacts are unavoidable. Yet states have not adopted these safeguards
spontaneously. Rather, states have done so in response to pressure
from indigenous communities and their supporters, who helped craft
the international instruments that articulate the IDSs and have
employed a mix of protest, litigation, and advocacy to secure parallel
reforms at the domestic level.3 0 7

B. Political Concessions Short of Control
In response to these pressures, higher authorities have made a
number of concessions to local interests but have been willing to go only
so far. Specifically, they have consistently crafted the various
community rights and powers to provide a degree of influence and
benefits to local interests, but not outright control over major
development activities. Higher authorities may be swayed by

eds., 2003) ("Too often, these costs (externalities) are not adequately taken into account
by decision makers, regulatory authorities and developers, partly because they are not
easily identifiable, quantifiable and measurable."); Libby Porter, Rights or Containment?
The Politics of Aboriginal Cultural Heritage in Victoria, 37 AUSTRALIAN GEOGRAPHER

355, 368 (2006) (relating an instance in which ring trees having cultural significance to
an Australian Aboriginal community were not recorded during a state-commissioned
survey because the trees did not fit within criteria recognized by the state cultural
management framework).
307.
MA'TIAs AHReN, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES' STATUS IN THE INTERNATIONAL

LEGAL SYSTEM 113 (2016) ("Although under UN rules of procedures, states formally
owned the process, in practice, indigenous peoples' representatives participated in the
UNDRIP negotiations essentially on par with state negotiators."); ANAYA, supra note 22,
at 45 (arguing that the movement to establish an international framework for indigenous
rights "has involved, and substantially been driven by, indigenous peoples themselves,"
with important contributions from NGOs, independent experts, and human rights
organs of international institutions); DERRICK HINDERY, FROM ENRON To Evo: PIPELINE
POLITICS, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTALISM, AND INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN BOLIVIA 168 (2013)

(asserting that pressure from indigenous peoples and NGOs prompted the Bolivian
government to ratify the ILO Convention, endorse UNDRIP, and establish consultation
requirements in domestic law); Tracey Lindberg, Contemporary CanadianResonance of
an Imperial Doctrine, in DISCOVERING INDIGENOUS LANDS: THE DOCTRINE OF DISCOVERY
IN THE ENGLISH COLONIES 126, 127 (Robert J. Miller et al. eds., 2010) (asserting that the

Canadian government's recognition of a duty to consult with and accommodate
indigenous groups "followed an era of Indigenous activism, legal challenges, and
Canadian governmental response"); Making the Most of ILO Convention 169, CULTURAL

SURVIVAL Q. MAG. (March 1994), https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/culturalsurvival-quarterly/making-most-ilo-convention-169
(last visited Oct. 23, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/Q3AH-Y3RD] (archived Oct. 23, 2017) (describing the role played by
indigenous peoples, NGOs, and the ILO in the negotiation of the ILO Convention).
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community input in particular cases but jealously guard their position
as the dominant players in development.
1.

The Line Between Influence and Control

'

One manifestation of this pattern is the careful tailoring of
regulatory powers of local governments in the United States. As
explained in Part II.A.1 above, state governments have delegated
considerable regulatory responsibility to local governments and have
generally allowed them to determine some aspects of how fracking and
other development activities are carried out. Yet state and federal
courts have consistently struck down local ordinances that prohibited
or significantly impeded activities that were authorized by state law.
In other words, higher authorities in the United States have generally
accepted local influence over development activities but have pushed
back when local authorities effectively sought to veto them. In addition,
the US Supreme Court has used the Nollan-Dolan test to restrict local
exactions on developers, seeking to ensure that any conditions imposed
on developers are proportional to project impacts.
A similar pattern has played out abroad with local regulatory
powers. In Spain, for example, despite having granted the autonomous
communities a greater role in governance, the central government
retained ownership of subsurface resources and sole authority to grant
hydrocarbon concessions. 30 8 While the autonomous communities may
express their views on whether or not concessions should be granted,
they lack the power to block them.3 09 Moreover, when communities
have issued bans or moratoria on fracking within their territory, the
Spanish Constitutional Court has struck them down, deeming them
inconsistent with state prerogatives.3 1 0 The Bolivian central
government drew a similar line when it granted new forms of
autonomy to the country's regions in the new constitution adopted in
31
2009 but retained control over resource development.
In fact, even when central governments have purported to devolve
powers to local authorities that give these authorities outright control
over major development activities, central governments have
frequently sought to take those powers back. As noted in Part II.A.2,
despite having enacted a law that on its face requires consent from
local governments for mining projects, the central government in the
Philippines subsequently disputed local governments' authority to

308.
Lin, supra note 7, at 1047.
309.
Id.
Id. at 1048-49 (discussing fracking bans enacted in the autonomous
310.
communities of Cantabria and La Rioja and rulings by the Constitutional Court).
311.
See supra Part II.A.2.a.
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withhold consent. Tellingly, however, even as the President sought to
curtail that power, he signaled a willingness to accord local
governments more influence and benefits. Specifically, Executive Order
No. 79 directed responsible agencies to coordinate more closely with
local governments in environmental regulation and enforcement,3 1 2 to
ensure the timely release of the funds promised to local governments
pursuant to revenue-sharing mandates, and to study "the possibility of
increasing [local governments'] share."31 3 Further, Executive Order
No. 79 declared that the central government would not enter into any
new mining agreements "until a legislation rationalizing existing
revenue sharing schemes and mechanisms shall have taken effect." 3 14
Senegal provides another example. Despite having passed a law
that gave local governments the right to determine whether or not local
forests would be exploited commercially,3 15 in practice Senegalese
central authorities "retained almost all powers over commercial
forestry decisions-they still decide how much production, where,
when, and by whom." 316 Central authorities reportedly have done so by
pressuring local officials to sign off on decisions made at the central
level-even when the local population opposes commercial timber
harvesting. 3a7
As noted above in Part II.B, EIA and public participation regimes
have similarly been calibrated to give local communities and other
members of the public opportunities to provide input into
environmental decision making, but not control over outcomes.
Members of the public can express their views, but they do not have a
veto over projects under consideration. And while higher authorities
are required to take into account environmental, social, and cultural
impacts, the fact that a project will have such impacts does not prevent
3
these authorities from approving it.

18

The same dynamic has played out as countries have incorporated
protections for indigenous and traditional communities in their
domestic legal frameworks. As noted above in Part II.C, states often
have been willing to conduct EIAs, take measures to facilitate
participation in decision making, and even share benefits. Yet states
have generally resisted any binding legal obligation to secure FPIC

312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

Executive Order No. 79, supra note 103, § 2.
Id. § 12.
Id. § 4.
Ribot, Agrawal & Larson, supra note 68, at 1867.
Id. at 1868.
Id.
See Neil Craik, Principle 17: Environmental Impact Assessment, in THE RIO

DECLARATION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT: A COMMENTARY 451-52 (Jorge E.

Vifiuales ed., 2015) (the basic characteristics of NEPA have been incorporated into other
domestic and international EIA regimes, including the fact that its requirements are
procedural and do not "require agencies to adopt the least impactful alternative or to
necessarily mitigate identified environmental harms").
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from impacted indigenous or traditional communities. While the
Philippines seems on its face to be an exception, reports of widespread
violations of the FPIC obligation suggest that indigenous groups'
ability to withhold consent is limited in practice.
2.

Reasons for Resisting Local Control

Numerous factors can contribute to higher authorities' resistance
to granting local interests control over development activities and the
greater benefits that would flow from such control. In some cases,
higher authorities may be motivated by a simple desire to maintain
their own power and privileges or those of favored interest groups.3 19
Yet principled arguments can sometimes be made for resisting local
control.
As discussed above in Part II.A.2, the results of decentralization
processes have highlighted a host of potential problems that can result
from giving greater influence or benefits to local governments. These
problems can include weakening of regulatory standards and the
resulting overexploitation of local resources, capture of benefits by
corrupt local elites, increase in economic disparities within a country
or region, and social conflict among groups competing for benefits.
Whether or not these problems materialize depends on several factors,
including the capacity of local governments and whether or not
mechanisms exist for holding those governments accountable for their
actions. 320 If higher authorities were to give local governments outright
control over development activities, it may take away whatever
upward accountability would otherwise exist.
In some cases, higher authorities may feel that they need to
maintain control over decision making and revenues to protect the
interests of low-income or minority groups. 321 For example, when the

See Danielson, supra note 268, at 34 ("[T]here are national governments that
319.
do not want local people to receive more resources, especially where those local people
are of a different ethnicity than the group who run the national government. At a
minimum, national government may want resources channeled to its political allies ...
320.
See Ida Aju Pradnja Resosudarmo, Closer to People and Trees: Will
Decentralisation Work for the People and the Forests of Indonesia?, in DEMOCRATIC
&

DECENTRALISATION THROUGH A NATURAL RESOURCE LENS 110, 112 (Jesse C. Ribot

Anne M. Larson eds., 2005) (summarizing variables likely to determine the outcomes of
decentralization); Stoa, supra note 26, at 34 (discussing risks associated with limited
local governmental capacity).
See JESSE C. RIBOT, DEMOCRATIC DECENTRALIZATION OF NATURAL
321.
RESOURCES: INSTITUTIONALIZING POPULAR PARTICIPATION 18 (Martha Schultz ed., 2002)

("In decentralizations concerning natural resources, inequitable local decision making
and benefit distribution is frequently observed. Local elites may be more prejudiced
against the poor than those at higher levels. Dominant ethnic groups can use their new
powers to take advantage of weaker ones.").
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resource-rich regions of Bolivia sought control over resource
development, some characterized the movement as an attempt by
economic elites in those regions to protect their own wealth and
privilege to the detriment of the country's indigenous and low-income
communities. 322 Indeed, central government officials accused
supporters of regional autonomy of racism-a perception reinforced by
reported acts of discrimination and violence toward the local
indigenous minority. 323
Higher authorities may also be concerned that, if local
communities were given outright control over development activities,
they would reject some proposals without proper justification. Scholars
have noted that communities can have an exaggerated perception of
projects' risks, in part because of the difficulty that laypersons may
have evaluating highly technical and scientific information.3 24
Moreover, even if stakeholders know that a particular risk is very
unlikely to manifest, it can still generate significant fear.3 25 Finally,

322.
See, e.g., Franz Chavez, BOLIVIA: Local Indigenous Leaders Beaten and
Publicly Humiliated, INTER PRESS SERVICE (May 27, 2008), http://www.ipsnews.net/
(last visited
2008/05/bolivia-local-indigenous-leaders-beaten-and-publicly-humiliated/
Oct. 21, 2017) [https://perma.cc/NJ25-R4M3] (archived Oct. 21, 2017) (asserting that the
autonomy movement is "spearheaded by the rightwing business and political elites" of
European and mixed-race ancestry, while "[t]he aim of the leftwing Morales
administration is to distribute the revenues from the eastern provinces' natural gas
reserves and other sources of wealth more evenly, in order to improve the living
conditions of the country's indigenous people, most of whom live in appalling poverty");
Nicole Fabricant, Defending Democracy?: Human Rights Discourse in Santa Cruz,
Bolivia, NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 23, 24 (2011) (asserting that eastern elites
perceived threats to their "economic investments and historic privilege" from President
Morales' redistributive agenda, prompting them to seek "control [over] natural resources

and their exploitation").
323.
Rory Carroll & Andres Schipani, Bolivia: Revolt Against the Peasant
President, GUARDIAN (May 3, 2008) (last visited Oct. 23, 2017) [https://perma.cc/B2QXQDD2] (archived Oct. 23, 2017) (quoting a central government official as asserting that
"[r]acism and exclusion is a part of this autonomy process."); ChAvez, supra note 322
(reporting attacks by autonomy supporters on indigenous individuals and officials'
reactions); Fabricant, supra note 322, at 25 (discussing incidents of "racist and
discriminatory behavior" including attacks on "anyone who looked indigenous"); Monte
Reel, Bolivia's Richest Region Votes Solidly for Autonomy, WASH. POST (May 5, 2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/04/AR2008050402147.
html (last visited Oct. 23, 2017) [https://perma.cc/Z95S-8AAK] (archived Oct. 23, 2017)
(some opponents of regional autonomy "believe the autonomy drive is fueled by racism").
324.
See Dietz & Stern, supra note 117, at 55 (citations omitted) ("[P]ublic
estimates of the risk of injury or death associated with various technologies do not match
the estimates of experts or actuarial and epidemiological studies."); id. at 142 ("Many
interested and affected parties lack sufficient technical and scientific background to
understand the scientific issues as scientists present them."); ECCLESTON, supra note 30,
at 177 ("Fears associated with controversial projects such as hazardous waste
incineration frequently far exceed the actual risks.").
325.
David B. Spence, Responsible Shale Gas Production:Moral Outrage vs. Cool
Analysis, 25 FORDHAM ENvTL. L. REV. 141, 183 (2013) (discussing neurobiological
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there is a well-documented tendency for communities to oppose socially
beneficial projects when the impacts will be felt locally, but the benefits
will be distributed more broadly: the "not in my backyard" or NIMBY
phenomenon. 326 Accordingly, it is sometimes argued that giving local
communities a veto over development decisions could hold the broader
public interest hostage to unfounded local fears or NIMBYism. 327
Finally, some states have contended that any obligation to secure
FPIC from impacted indigenous or traditional communities would be
"discriminatory" toward others in society. 3 28 This view of FPIC
contrasts with the obligation's intended purpose, which is the precise
opposite: to mitigate power discrepancies and overcome patterns of
discrimination by buttressing the position of particularly vulnerable
communities. Moreover, the international authorities discussed in
Part II.C.1 suggest that an FPIC obligation applies only in narrow
circumstances, including when a development project will require a
community's relocation or will have a major impact on its lands and
resources.3 29 Nevertheless, the argument that safeguards for
indigenous or traditional groups are a form of reverse discrimination
likely resonates with some voters, who see deference to these groups
as an obstacle to development initiatives that would produce benefits
for the broader society.
C. PrivateMechanisms as Supplements to Public Gains
Whatever reasons higher authorities have had for limiting
communities' formal rights and powers, by doing so these authorities

evidence of the impact on fear on decision making and its implications for community
views about fracking).
Krause et al., "Not in (or Under) My Backyard": Geographic Proximity and
326.
Public Acceptance of Carbon Capture and Storage Facilities, 34 RISK ANALYSIS 529, 530
(2014) (discussing the NIMBY phenomenon and carbon capture and storage facilities
canceled due to community opposition); see generally Susan Lorde Martin, Wind Farms
and NIMBYs: GeneratingConflict, Reducing Litigation, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 427
(2010) (discussing NIMBYism in the context of wind farms and cell phone towers).
See, e.g., Nickie Vlavianos & Chidinma Thompson, Alberta's Approach to
327.
Local Governance in Oil and Gas Development, 48 ALBERTA L. REV. 55, 56 (2010)
("[C]entralized decision-making guarantees that local concerns do not prevail over the
concerns of the greater whole. Allowing all decisions to be subject to a local veto could
promote a 'not in my backyard' phenomenon that could undermine the well-being of the
whole province in the interests of a few.").
See Miller, supra note 209, at 80 (discussing state objections to the concept
328.
of FPIC during the drafting of UNDRIP).
See James Anaya (Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and
329.
Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People), Promotion and Protection of All Human
Rights, Civil Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to
Development, T 47, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/34 (July 15, 2009) (describing circumstances in
which FPIC is required under UNDRIP and jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights).
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have left local interests without the ability to address, unilaterally,
some legitimate concerns about development activities. It is in this
context that the private mechanisms outlined in Part III have
proliferated. These mechanisms represent attempts to compensate for
remaining gaps in domestic legal frameworks and secure for
communities the equivalent of a veto right, or at least forms of
influence and benefits beyond those formalized in law.
The gap-filling role of financial institution standards and nonbinding private-sector guidelines is evident from the fact that they
contemplate minimum environmental and social protections
notwithstanding the content or effectiveness of local law.33 0 Indeed,
some financial institution standards have been crafted to provide
protections that are often absent from domestic legal frameworkssuch as a requirement to obtain FPIC from affected indigenous
communities 3 3 1-or that may exist on paper but are rarely enforced. 332
The OECD Guidelines and UN Guiding Principles similarly call for
enterprises to comply with the standards they articulate whether or
not local law so requires.333
Furthermore, as explained above in Part III.B, communities
increasingly employ private agreements with developers to secure
benefits or forms of influence that are not mandated by law. In some
cases, local governments have even negotiated benefits or impact
mitigations that those governments would have been precluded from
imposing unilaterally due to state law preemption or takings
jurisprudence. Examples include development agreements in the
United States that provide for community benefits that would violate
the Nollan-Dolan test, and operator agreements between

Morgera, supra note 244, at 325 (observing that financial institution
330.
standards and non-binding guidelines go "beyond legal requirements at the national
level" in establishing protections for affected communities).
331.
Ariel Meyerstein, Transnational Private Financial Regulation and
SustainableDevelopment: An EmpiricalAssessment of the Implementation of the Equator
Principles, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 487, 502, 514, 562-63 (2013) (asserting that the
law in some countries may allow projects to go forward without input from affected
communities, and discussing the consequent adoption of consultation requirements in
the Equator Principles, as well as the IFC's ultimate adoption of an FPIC requirement
for projects impacting indigenous peoples).
332.
See id. at 503 (asserting that developing countries frequently have
appropriate laws and regulations in place, but regulators in those countries often do not
enforce them effectively).
333.
See UN Guiding Principles, supranote 261, at 13 (asserting that businesses'
responsibility to respect human rights "exists independently of States' abilities and/or
willingness to fulfil their own human rights obligations, and . . . exists over and above
compliance with national laws and regulations protecting human rights."); OECD
Guidelines, supra note 257, at 39 (observing that the OECD Guidelines are
"supplementary principles and standards of behaviour of a non-legal character" which
"extend beyond the law in many cases").
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municipalities and oil companies that impose technical restrictions on
fracking more onerous than state oil and gas regulations. 334
Private mechanisms have a number of advantages that account
for their growing prominence and ability to produce these sorts of
supplemental community gains. One such advantage is the simple fact
that these mechanisms operate on a case-by-case basis and therefore
do not require permanent, broad-based political change. While
financial institution standards and non-binding guidelines may secure
protections or benefits not required by domestic law in particular cases,
they operate outside the domestic legal system and do not require any
formal reallocation of authority or entitlements within society.
Similarly, any agreement reached through private bargaining applies
only to the parties; other communities cannot necessarily expect the
same terms for similar projects. For obvious reasons, it is easier to
strike bargains between individual parties than to adopt new laws
apportioning authority and benefits between competing levels of
government or among communities, or to raise the regulatory
standards across the board for a particular activity.
Another advantage of private mechanisms is their flexibility. The
community-developer consultations contemplated by standards and
guidelines, as well as any actual agreements that may be negotiated,
allow the conditions of the project to be tailored to the particular
preferences of the interested parties. This contrasts with the one-sizefits-all approach typically employed when conditions are set via public
regulation, or when benefits are distributed via intergovernmental
revenue-sharing schemes.
At the same time, private mechanisms are subject to limitations
that can undermine their utility in some cases. Financial institution
standards apply only if the developer seeks funding from an institution
that imposes them. And non-binding guidelines, by definition, depend
on voluntary compliance. Moreover, bargaining between developers
and communities may be undermined by corruption, lack of full
disclosure, or other negotiating practices that would prevent any
agreement signed from reflecting the informed will of the community
as a whole. 3 3 5 In addition, whatever benefits are secured by the

community may not be distributed equitably or may lead to social

334.
See supraPart III.B.
335.
See Foster, supra note 241, at 68-76 (detailing reports of bribery and other
questionable consultation practices in connection with development projects in Latin
America, the Asia-Pacific Region, and Africa); Gibson & O'Faircheallaigh, supra note 18,
at 55 ("Questions of legitimacy can surface as people fight over who should have the right
to negotiate agreements. When organizations such as band or tribal councils make
decisions about IBAs, they sometimes do so without the informed consent of all
community members.").
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disruptions.3 3 6 Finally, in some cases bargaining may not be productive
simply because the community will not consent to the project under
any terms.
Accordingly, while private mechanisms can produce gains for
communities, they are not guaranteed to do so and may even be
counterproductive in some instances. Moreover, communities may not
be able to bring developers to the bargaining table in the first place
absent strong formal rights and powers. For example, municipalities
in Colorado were able to induce oil companies to agree to technical
restrictions on their fracking operations only because these
municipalities could have delayed or denied certain local regulatory
approvals that the companies required. Similarly, IBAs have become
common in Canada largely as a result of the federal government having
recognized a duty to consult with and accommodate Aboriginal groups,
which gives these stakeholders opportunities to delay or hinder
developers' plans-and hence vital leverage.3 3 7 For all of these reasons,
private mechanisms are best seen as supplements to public avenues of
influence rather than as substitutes. Simply put, the more formal
rights and powers that communities can secure in the political arena,
the more successful they should be in negotiating private agreements
that serve long-term community interests.

V.

CONCLUSION

This Article has demonstrated that a remarkable series of legal
reforms in recent decades has transformed the position of local
communities around the world vis-A-vis development. While
communities have long been impacted by development, they are
increasingly having impacts of their own in the other direction and

336.
See Danielson, supra note 268, at 34 (summarizing potential pitfalls of
community benefits, including the risk of empowering one gender over another or "giving
more money and power to one of the competing social or ethnic groups"); George K.
Foster, ForeignInvestment and Indigenous Peoples: Optionsfor PromotingEquilibrium
between Economic Development and Indigenous Rights, 33 MICH. J. INT'L L. 627, 687
(2012) ("[Alfter experiencing ...
the sudden affluence associated with a development
project, indigenous peoples can face a loss of culture and identity, a breakdown in
familial bonds, increased substance abuse, and greater economic dependence."); Gibson
& O'Faircheallaigh, supra note 18, at 141 ("[P]ayments can be quickly frittered away on
consumer goods, including alcohol, if structures are not in place to ensure they are
invested or allocated to family and community priorities.").
337.
See Martin Papillon, Introduction: The Promises and Pitfalls of Aboriginal
Multilevel Governance, in CANADA: THE STATE OF THE FEDERATION, 2013: ABORIGINAL

MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE 3, 12 (Martin Papillon & Andr6 Juneau eds., 2016)
(attributing the rise of IBAs to the Canadian Supreme Court's recognition of a duty to
consult and accommodate, which exposes developers to "potential economic costs of
protracted legal challenges" and encourages negotiation over project impacts and
benefit-sharing).
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securing benefits that can transform their economic prospects in
positive ways.
The discussion has also revealed, however, that under some
circumstances increased local power and revenues can have unforeseen
and troubling consequences. Not only can sudden infusions of cash lead
to social disruptions, but local control without adequate capacity and
accountability can produce a host of problems-from a weakening of
regulatory standards to violations of minority rights. Because of these
concerns and pressures from other actors-as well as their own selfinterest-higher authorities have pushed back against some
community demands and retained a dominant role in the development
process.
Into this context of political gridlock have stepped private
mechanisms, which have the potential to produce additional gains for
communities on a case-by-case basis, without threatening the core
interests of other actors. These private mechanisms are generally
easier to implement than formal political change and offer considerable
flexibility. Yet these mechanisms have limitations of their own and
ultimately their effectiveness depends on communities possessing
robust formal rights and powers. Consequently, as the wave of
community participation in development continues to wash over the
globe, continued innovation will be needed-and can be expected-in
both the public and private realms.

